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The work is devoted to the study of the hierarchical organisation of values in the process of 
their change, as part of the broader context of changing political culture recognised as 
important factor in political behaviour of the population or the political élites, and interpreted 
as complex variable including in addition to the value system also the set of societal 
traditions, skills and attitudes. An attempt is made to link the adherence to social values to 
political preferences, and to describe, based on sociological approach, some elements of 
existing political culture and political attitudes as factors and preconditions of democratic 
change in Georgia. In particular, voting behaviour is studied as area where public 
participation in political process takes place and where political élites compete among one 
another for influence and domination.  
 
Communication messages by political leaders and parties during pre-election campaigns, as 
well as their assumed effect on people’s attitudes, interpretations, and behaviours, have been 
analysed. A week before the presidential elections in April 2000 a survey was carried out in 
order to identify the most conspicuous problems as perceived by respondents, as well as their 
attitudes towards various qualities of the national leader and different external orientations of 
the international politics. Earlier, surveys were conducted during the Parliamentary elections 
of October 31, 1999, and of November 5, 1995, in order to assess political preferences of the 
electorate. Electoral programmes of the leading parties in 1999 elections have been compared 
with the similar results for 1995 elections in order to obtain indications on the dynamics of 
political thinking.  
 
The study has mainly concentrated on the capital of Georgia and its population, as the process 
of state-building and democratic reform is most visible in the city of Tbilisi, while in many 
provinces the pace of change is still very slow. The research goal of the study was to develop 
a set of value items that reflected the way in which the adult population saw their world in 
political perspective. Again, elections were at the focus of the study, as they have special 
features making them especially important in studying political preferences, particularly the 
notion that voting is a form of action with high social desirability.  
 
Despite the demands posed by the change of political and economic structure and 
environment, cultural and political legacies hinder both élite and ordinary citizens in 
reorienting toward values of personal or corporate responsibility, transparency and 
accountability. The study has demonstrated decisive effect of current conditions and needs on 
value orientations: people do not largely adhere to post-materialist, libertarian, democratic 
values until more basic, materialist values of safety, stability and livelihood are not satisfied. 
So, respondents were most unanimous in choosing order in the country over personal 
freedom. Another alarming tendency is the great gap between political élites actively 
involved in governance or directing opposition politics, and the population at large, 
emotionally concerned but lacking skills and levers for more political participation. Results 
of the study pointed to the democratic immaturity of the electorate, to high reliance on the 
personal features of the leader and indifference to party ideologies and agenda.  
However, there are certain positive trends observed as well. Such was the reinforcement of 
the opposition to ruling coalition in recent vote that points to the strengthening of the 
democratic environment. Preferences revealed indicate to increased expectation of electorate 
for positive political goals instead of overall criticism, craving for stability and positive 
outcomes. The study also pointed to different standards used by different cohorts in their 
evaluations of political issues, with younger people showing stronger adherence to post-
materialist values. While there are many obstacles to rapid positive change of political culture 
in the direction of more democratic one, the process is nevertheless on move, with younger 
generation showing more active and pro-democracy stance. Orientations toward the western 
models and values, support of market oriented reform and of civic values is good reason for 






Following the disintegration of the USSR, disruption of the totalitarian communist system 
and subsequent independence brought dynamics of transition that turned out to be a complex 
and extremely painful process for Georgia. Independence and the new political reality got 
unexpectedly imposed over people that appeared unprepared to the new way of life. 
Democracy, an ideology, which together with market economy was cherished by the new 
political leadership proved difficult to exercise in reality. Both those who ruled and those to 
be ruled are equally burdened with the same experience of living in totalitarian regime, 
ideology of which was found to be more deeply rooted than presumed to be. Even now, the 
real need for reform has not yet matured sufficiently to enable a social discourse to take place 
that could help to structure public opinion and interest groups. Nor does there exist any social 
group or stratum that has clear understanding of the preferred model of development of the 
country. Even the most sensitive issues are dealt by both the governments and the common 
people on the basis of irrational emotions and myths, rather than pragmatic approach, 
conceptual thinking and verifiable facts. This situation was particularly evident during recent 
pre-election campaigns, when it appeared that practically no political leader or party have any 
clear ideology, programme or models, other than rather embryonic schemes based mostly on 
intuitive social-democratic or nationalist patterns. The same can be said concerning political 
élites in general, which makes the process of reform so dependent on the personality of the 
leaders, external pressures, popular attitudes and other random factors, rather than on solid 
social basis and explicit group interests. Indeed, post-communist countries like Georgia 
provide opportunity to examine patterns of and attitudes toward representation in a society in 
which the electoral institutions and preferences are newly emerging, and this makes the study  
of these processes to acquire general scientific and practical significance. 
 
For many years the Georgian society held resistance against deliberate and also spontaneous 
pressures from Russia, substantiated by absolute political dominance of the 'big brother'. 
Under such conditions Western culture, hardly differentiated into European and American, 
was considered by national élites as a potential, and favourable, counterbalance to the 
policies of Russification. With the independence brought by the disintegration of the USSR, 
this process gained strength, and the Western way of life, as well as the globalisation process 
equally are considered as purely positive phenomenon, while few alarmist voices that are 
talking of the threats of homogenisation that may wipe out national distinctiveness and, 
ultimately, endanger the national culture, are paid little attention. Western political value 
system, together with the traditional culture are another set considered to be alternative to the  
legacy of Soviet despotism, totalitarian ideologisation of life, and cynical doubletalk. Now, 
ruling political élites never get tired to stress their devotion to Western, democratic values 
and goals, however practices might differ greatly from stated values. At the same time there 
are some specific features such as extreme political pragmatism and opportunism that makes 
it impossible to judge about political ideology of an actor on the basis of his party affiliation 
or statements, as demonstrated during the last series of parliamentary elections. Still, one of 
the signs of political immaturity of the Georgian state and the society is the permanent 
referring to Russia as the main cause of problems and at the same time the clue to the solution 
of most of problems. Even among those who reveal hostile attitude towards former 
metropolis, the Russian factor serves the same role of diminishing their own responsibility for 
the political processes, as it is only too natural to blame the omnipresent Moscow hand in all 
the failures and inadequacies. Political conditions under Soviet rule were specific, 
characteristic for pseudo-sovereign status of Soviet republics. No important decision was 
made without control from Moscow, though local government had to play its special 
subordinate role in pan-Soviet doublethink, doubletalk and double-economy. Defensive and 
theatrical cynicism and moral relativism, which has served so well in resisting to the 
dominance of Communist ideology, ruins today the capacity of Georgians to build their own 
state.  
 
One more powerful obstacle to designing Georgia’s future is the deficiency of the ability of 
political élites of formulating political strategies, explicit and clear concept of development. 
Hardly is observed any explicitly formulated vision of the future, any concepts of solutions, 
but mere battle of words, slogans and symbols. Also, Georgia’s political establishment has no 
explicitly conceptualised and formulated hierarchy of political values, just the commonly 
stressed importance of territorial integrity issue and vague leaning towards the west 
understood as something different from Soviet and developing worlds, associated with wealth 
and high quality of life. Anti-meritocratic principles of personnel appointment policies, 
technocratic, or egocentric system of preferences are all characteristics of the present day 
political élite in Georgia. The widespread culture of clientelism and a mentality of 
dependence are not easy to shake off. Inherent is a lack of concern for institutional success; 
management by directives rather than by negotiation; lack of co-operation, both direct and 
indirect corruption. The new bureaucrats combine their official and private business 
activities, thus creating permanent conflicts of interest. Another legacy of the old system is 
above-mentioned unwillingness of state bureaucracy to take responsibility and initiatives. 
Due to this, there is a lack of independent and creative thinking; as well as no established 
system of professional ethics. All these factors contribute to inertia and low levels of progress 
in terms of managing and implementing the transition. 
 
Nevertheless, Georgia is slowly but steadily progressing towards a more democratic civic 
society. Still, the concept and the structures of civil society are weakly rooted in people’s 
lives. Now, most of the political institutions, including the government and leading political 
parties, explicitly acknowledge and support democratic values and rights, need of pluralism 
and respect to minorities, demonstrating their best to advance an open and democratic 
society. However, the process of setting up democratic freedom is still in its beginning. Not 
that most of the political parties or the political élite lack the will to establish a genuine 
democratic society. It is rather that required changes in the mentality of the population are 
slow to come about, while democratisation is impeded also by inertia, outdated ideological 
stereotypes and the vague status of democratic values in current modes of thought. The 
present political system in Georgia has indeed many of the formal attributes of democracy. 
Nevertheless, most of its structures and institutions are underdeveloped or anyway not quite  
what is expected of them in the western democratic perspective, which is the declared 
predominant model. So, e.g., there are next to no organisational structures uniting the labour 
force, or defending its rights, as traditional soviet trade-unions have lost whatever public 
respect they had and simply became property-holders for their leadership, while no new 
trade-unions have yet emerged that have any influence or organisational capacity. This fact 
has direct political connotation as well, as in those countries, “where workers have been able 
to form strong unions and obtain representation in politics the disintegrative forms of political 
cleavage are least likely to be found” (Lipset, 1960, p. 2). Development of legal guarantees of 
democratic freedoms and especially their implementation; of democratic institutions and self-
governance structures, of labour movement/trade unions, and especially development of civic 
education - disseminating of knowledge and awareness by wide public of democratic rights 
of a person or a group, are necessary prerequisites for both pluralism and civic society. 
However, there are certain dangers in the democratisation process itself. It involves the 
removal of state constraints on individual behaviour, a loosening of social inhibitions, and 
uncertainty and confusion about standards of morality, by bringing the state authority itself 
under question. So, a corrupt judge may be much better protected by democratic procedures, 
and can nevertheless continue socially undesirable behaviour at increased extent, as 
demonstrated by recent difficulties with judiciary reform. Political leaders in new 
circumstances tend to resort to populism and appeal to indigenous ethnic and confessional 
loyalties, interpreting democracy in the most anachronistic way as tyranny of majority. 
Democratic elections may under certain condition lead easily to the victory a political force 
apparently committed to an essentially anti-democratic ideology. Only a robust civil society, 
with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, can 
resist democratic reversal and is a remedy against such tendencies. Even much desired 
economic development will enhance the viability of democracy only insofar as it brings 
appropriate changes in social structure and political culture. 
 
Our study is mainly concentrated on the capital of Georgia and its population, and there are 
certain reasons for that. The process of state-building and democratic reform takes place in 
most visible way in the city of Tbilisi, while in many provinces the pace of change is still 
very slow. Today Tbilisi is the capital of Georgia in all senses, economic, cultural, and 
political, although it may be not fully so for some parts of the population of Georgia, in 
particular for those living in secessionist quasi-states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 
partly for ethnic Armenians and Azeris, these latter culturally attracted by respectively 
Yerevan and Baku. This reflects specific transitional situation in Georgia, in which the state 
and its symbolic realisation – the capital - are not projecting their influence and attraction 
over all parts of the country. The role of Tbilisi today is thus rooted in and influenced by 
many aspects and factors. It is definitely the political centre, where most of decisions are 
made, where function the headquarters of all state agencies, banks and financial agencies, 
scientific, educational and information sources and institutions. At the same time Tbilisi is a 
big marketplace, where people come from all regions in order to buy and sell. While most of 
rural areas and smaller towns experience deprivation from services, information, and finance, 
and are actually isolated and impoverished, Tbilisi continues to attract population from other 
places due to incomparably bigger opportunities for business, career, communication, or 
leisure. Informational isolation of the rest of the country, over-concentration of finance and 
trade adds to the importance of the capital, but also adds pressure to its infrastructure. During 
the last century the population structure in Tbilisi has been totally reshuffled. Most of 
traditional urbanites in Tbilisi at the beginning of the last century were Armenians, Persians 
and Russians, as Georgians traditionally were mostly involved in agriculture and lived in 
rural areas. As a result of emigration (deportation) of ethnic minorities, and the rapid growth  
of the city (reaching today more than 1.5 million inhabitants) with rural migrants, current 
inhabitants of Tbilisi are significantly urbanites in first or second generation, which fact 
expresses itself in many aspects of behavioural culture. So, for many foreigners an 
unexpected surprise is the shocking difference between clean, cosy apartments and dirty, 
totally uncared “secondary” territory – entrances, staircases, neighbouring space, a specific 
cultural behavioural stereotype for newcomers with different sense of responsibility and 
territory (Newman, 1972). Often new migrants, as are the IDPs from the conflict zone of 
Abkhazi, in addition to different urban or environmental culture often speaking different – 
Megrelian – language, cause significant irritation of those, who consider themselves “old” 
urbanites, and the newcomers as invaders. Considering oneself to be an old “Tbiliseli” – 
Tbilisian – is a matter of prestige and sometimes a political slogan, and even during the anti-
Gamsakhurdia coup d’état of 1991 the confrontation line often followed the distinction 
between ‘Tbiliseli’s and provincials, supporters of the ousted president. At the same time, 
process of state building and recovering from political economic crisis, continues to 
strengthen the central authorities in Tbilisi, while the process of democratic decentralisation 
of power and the much discussed federalisation of territorial arrangement of the country are 
at their early stage. It is sufficient to say, that great majority of Georgian territorial units, 
apart from three (former) autonomies, are actually administered by governors appointed from 
Tbilisi. At the same time the symbolic meaning of Tbilisi as the capital of Georgia is only 
increasing, with increased concentration of the population, the power and the finance there. 
Equally, Tbilisi continues to be the centre of education and cultural life, and even the civic 
society is much more developed here than in any other part of Georgia. 
 
An important characteristic of current political disposition is the mutual suspicion of political 
élites and masses, the centre and the periphery. Those in power demand social responsibility 
from citizens and are mute to their own or the state’s responsibility towards citizens (e.g. as a 
rule, service contracts reflect only obligations of customers and actions in case of their 
violations, saying nothing of service provider’s obligations). Citizens demand responsibility 
from the state, largely ignoring their own responsibility or at times even expressing pride in 
their irresponsible behaviour. Ordinary citizens suspect material or ‘mafia’ interest behind 
every action of a political actor, expecting the same cynical attitude toward political 
statements or promises as in old Soviet times. Élites have no confidence in masses, trying to 
avoid where possible democratic structures and procedures of decision making under the 
pretext of democratic immaturity of population and its lack of political knowledge and skills. 
Similar attitude can be observed in relation to regional authorities, and especially to ethnic or 
religious minorities, perceived as instruments for manipulation by external actors rather than 
independent political actors on their own. This leads to the popularity of conspiracy theories, 
and lack of flexibility, inability to understand opponents’ viewpoint and, paradoxically 
enough, also lack of consistency in negotiations or relations in general. Within the varied set 
of conditions and amid the impatience, mistrust and fear, which seem to accompany 
leadership whose authority is relatively new and unsupported by tradition, a system of state 
controls has become tighter during last few years, while democratic reform, as in particular 
illustrated by last parliamentary and presidential elections, is not moving forward. The need 
for rigid control and continuous watchfulness enjoined upon the leadership, makes them, 
while officially relying upon strength, enthusiasm, and energy provided by the masses, 
fearful that unless the most rigid, minute, continuous, protective, and directive control is 
maintained, chaos will result. 
Ruling political élites never get tired to stress their devotion to democratic values and goals, 
however practices might differ greatly from stated values. More attentive analysis can also 
reveal certain stratification among them, depending upon their political roots and legacy, 
significantly defining behavioural or ideological stereotypes and patterns. At the same time 
there are some unifying features, such as extreme political pragmatism and opportunism, 
making it impossible to judge about political ideology of an actor on the basis of his party 
affiliation, as demonstrated during the last parliamentary elections. Indeed, instead of parties 
and electoral blocks united around certain political programmes, goals and strategies, we 
observed the only dominant motif for membership – maximisation of chances to be elected. 
In order to understand better political processes taking place in Georgia and their cultural 
antecedents, it is necessary to analyse both political élites, competing for power and influence 
over the population, and the population itself, both the object and the subject of political 
process. Interaction of these two main actors of political scene are best visible during and 
before elections, when élites demonstrate their election strategies, approaches and proposed 
policy concepts and agenda in competition for votes, while the population unequivocally 
shows its preferences to various complexes of features characterising each party through its 
voting choices.  
 
Georgia, during last several years, experienced a number of major elections – parliamentary 
and presidential elections of 1995, local elections of 1998, relatively recent parliamentary 
elections of October 1999 and presidential elections of April 2000. Although the political 
environment has significantly changed during these few years, and country has made certain 
steps towards more democracy, it is difficult to say that the last elections have been a step 
forward in this respect, at least from the viewpoint of violations of electoral law and rigging 
of vote. In fact, the elections of 1999got marred by allegations of vote fraud. "These elections 
can be called multi-party, but they weren't democratic," was the assessment of Nugzar 
Ivanidze, the director of the independent Fair Elections Society, while the OSCE chief 
monitor Nikolai Vuchanov in his turn stated that election standards were "unsatisfactory" in 
Ajara and at least in two other regions of Georgia. (Antadze 1999) At many polling stations, 
observers were barred from seeing ballot boxes, and at one polling station in Tbilisi, 15,000 
ballots went missing a few hours before the vote. Observers have also criticised the election 
law passed in this summer as giving too much advantage to pro-government parties and 
allowing them to field more candidates, due to the seven percent threshold that was raised 
from the five percent set for the 1995 elections. The result was to concentrate support for the 
two main party blocks – the Citizens' Union of Georgia and the Georgian Union of Revival, 
identified by the voters as Shevardnadze’s and Abashidze’s parties. The presidential elections 
of April 2000 were in their turn hardly any democratic breakthrough, as, although there was 
no strong alternative to the acting president Eduard Shevardnadze, both the pre-election 
campaigns and the voting were too marred by violations and demonstrated certain slowdown 
of the democratic transition. 
 
Nevertheless, elections were the major political events that gave a chance to citizens to 
express their preferences and make choice. For many Georgians the voted in last two 
elections was indeed a choice between the two perceptions of country’s future and foreign 
policy orientations as presented by two major rivalling blocks. To the supporters of the 
Georgian Revival, its leader Aslan Abashidze and the 2000 presidential candidate Jumber 
Patiashvili, Shevardnadze and his Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG) were 
'cosmopolitans’,*,out to destroy the country and the cause of separatist conflicts in Abkhazia 
and Ossetia, and 'slaves to Euro-Americanism'. In contrast, the Georgian Revival claimed to 
care about its homeland and promised timely payment of pensions and salaries. The Citizens'  
Union pointed that the Revival was chaotic conglomerated united solely by electoral 
pragmatism and will break up once in Parliament, pro-Russian, corrupt and Mafia-dominated 
at its core. Its leader Abashidze was commonly accused by Citizens' spokesmen of fraud and 
corruption. On the other hand, Citizens' Union claimed to be taking Georgia closer to Europe 
and further away from Russia. Defining the two's ideology is hard, as there is not much of 
conceptual nature behind these general lines and overall orientations. The economic reforms 
brought in by the CUG were politically centre-right, while the party retains its membership of 
the Socialist International and spends a high proportion of the state budget on the social 
sectors. The Revival in its turn combined an eclectic grouping of traditional left and reformist 
right. Ajara, where election observers were driven out of polling stations by force, is the 
home base of Aslan Abashidze, Shevardnadze's main opposition, who was undeterred by 
allegations of vote rigging in the October 1999 poll, and vowed to challenge Shevardnadze 
for the presidency in 2000 (when the April 2000 came, he withdrew his candidacy just before 
the actual elections). The undisputed facts working against the ruling CUG were the 
continuing worsening of the economic situation in Georgia, the widespread corruption, 
unpaid state sector salaries and pensions, and the gradual degradation of standards of living 
after initial improvement. Yet, while only 23 percent voted for the Citizens' Union in 1995, as 
much as 42 percent expressed support for them year 1999. 
 
All in all, 20 political parties and 13 coalitions have been registered ahead of the 1999 
parliamentary elections, but only three - Shevardnadze's Citizens’ Union of Georgia and 
Aslan Abashidze's Georgian Revival Union, and the Industry Will Save Georgia bloc 
garnered the minimum seven percent of the vote required to get into the 235-seat parliament. 
With all but a few disputed results in, the majority of 42 percent have voted for 
Shevardnadze's bloc and 26 percent for Abashidze's Revival, with slightly more than 7% 
obtained by Industrialists. The Labour Party, the surprise favourite of the local elections of 
the previous year, and the National Democratic Alliance, the second best in 1995 elections, 
came close to 7% barrier, introduction of which they have ardently supported but appeared 
unable to cross. Overall, almost 80 percent voted for the three parties that crossed the seven-
percent line. The other c. 20 percent wasted their votes on the parties that failed to cross the 
threshold. About two thirds of this group voted for Labour and two other parties and the rest 
of the votes were scattered between the minor parties. In contrast, in 1995 only 38 percent 
voted for the three parties that scored the minimum; a staggering 62 percent voted for parties 
that failed to beat the threshold and were thus left out of the parliament. At the very least at 
the last elections of 1999 the number of people whose votes were effectively wasted by their 
use on parties that failed the threshold has been substantially cut.  
 
 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND VALUES 
 
Overwhelming dominance in mass consciousness of beliefs, myths and symbols in 
transitional periods of history is nothing new. Symbols, metaphors and myths played equally 
great role in traditional Soviet double-think and double-talk. However, the post-Soviet reality 
gave new life to symbolic ways of thinking, created new fertile environment for irrationality 
and symbolisation of political attitudes and values. This is especially true in former Soviet 
periphery, Georgia, where Communist ideologems were never deeply rooted, but were rather 
considered as a set of the rules of the game imposed by external power, like it was only too 
often in her history. In Soviet times, individual rights were considered as having next to no 
importance as compared to the interests of the state. Nor was there any participation by 
ordinary citizens in government and the decision-making process. This resulted in the lack of  
a civil society infrastructure in the form of community self-organising or NGOs, as well as a 
lack of understanding of the values relating to democracy and community and civic 
responsibility and, even more importantly, a lack of expectation that these should be present. 
Political conditions were hardly conducive to civic society also immediately after 
independence. Civil wars, ethnic strife, economic crises interacted in a mutually reinforcing 
cycle. The absence of efficient government and legislation, as well as disintegrating law and 
order further led to decline of civic morale, devaluation of respect for the individual, for the 
rights of groups and for democratic liberties in general. Back in 1980s, the wind of 
perestroyka and the decomposition of traditional double-think environment created specific 
ideological vacuum and confusion causing what could be called, using the psychoanalytical 
term, national regression, massive resigning to the magic and chimerical world of symbols, 
myths, and slogans. 
 
Unique political disposition of early 1990s brought to life unprecedented crisis and turmoil. 
As Luc Reychler wrote some time ago: “Political surprises normally contain a double 
stimulus, namely to study the origins of the changes and the origins of our unawareness of 
them. There have been many post-facto explanations of the revolutionary transformations in 
Eastern Europe, but few explanations of the lack of foresight.” (Bawens & Reychler, 1994) 
This deep observation is well fit to the recent history of post-soviet Georgia as well. One of 
the reasons for the failure to understand why the science was and is unable to predict, ergo 
understand, dramatic processes taken place here, is the underestimation of psychological and 
axiological factors dominating the transitional societies. These factors find their overt 
expression in what political philosophers call political culture, understood as “socially 
transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, and habits of mind” (Gray, 1999, p.51), or “broadly 
shared set of ways of thinking about politics and government, a pattern of orientations to 
political objects” (Ranney 1990, p. 65). Indeed, democracy defined as “a government of the 
people, by the people and for the people” is probably nowhere fully realised, but its shape and 
extent is largely determined by nation’s political culture. However, even if political culture is 
recognised as important factor in political behaviour of the population or the political élites, 
there is much disagreement on what exactly is defined by this term on operational level, and 
how, methodologically, political culture could be observed and measured. At the same time, 
special caution is needed to avoid fashionable tendency to explain everything, deficiencies of 
democratic transition in the first place, solely by the notion of vaguely defined value system 
and political culture. 
 
Among scholars of democratisation, as Samuel Huntington puts it down, a major debate goes 
on concerning the issue of crafting versus preconditions, whether democratisation is primarily 
the product of political leaders who have the will and skill to bring it about, or the movement 
towards democracy depends on particular social, economic or cultural preconditions existing 
in the society. Having no ambition to find any final and general solution to this debate, we 
hope to describe based on social-psychological approach some elements of existing political 
culture and political attitudes as factors and preconditions of democratic change in Georgia. 
One should also keep in mind that some of the trends explicitly present in the development of 
other countries but not yet observable here may reveal themselves later, and thus in this sense 
one can indeed speak of different stages of development, when discussing such factors as 
democratic governance or the internationalisation of the labour market.  
Value is conceptualised as a belief concerning the desired mode of behaviour, which 
transcends the situation and is ordered by importance to other values; it serves as a guiding 
principle for selection and evaluation of behaviour, people or events (Schwartz, 1994). 
Values constitute high hierarchical order and in a considerable extent form the bases for 
attitudes, which in their turn are in many cases responsible for behaviour (Kristiansen & 
Zanna, 1994). Values, represented both on individual and situation levels, serve as a bridge 
between the personality and the society (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Grube, Mayton & Ball-
Rokeach, 1994). As cognitive representations of biological and societal needs, they shape 
individual needs into socially acceptable form, and as such they are sensitive to both, 
individual needs and societal demands. Values can be personal - centred on the self and 
guiding the achievement of individual goals, and social - centred on the society, forming the 
belief about what society should be striving for. Values form constellations or value 
orientations, one of such orientations of social values is difference between materialistic 
(‘maintain order in the nation’ and ‘fight rising prices’) and non-materialistic (‘give people 
more say in the decisions of the government’ and ‘protect freedom of speech’) goals 
(Inglehart, 1977). Another constellation formed by social values is ‘national strength and 
order’ and ‘international harmony and security’ (Braithwaite, 1994).  
 
Values are universal, but their relative importance varies across cultures, persons and the 
time. Being relatively stable culturally based values are still prone to changes, which can be 
stimulated by the changes in inner demands, by the changes in the environment and by their 
interaction. Change of value orientations is a slow and a gradual process. It is assumed that 
changes are more likely to occur quickly in changing environments and due to strong contacts 
with other societies (Nolan & Lenski, 1995). Transition to new political and economical 
system is a normative, history graded event (Baltes, 1983), i.e. an event, which stimulates 
change in the whole cohorts and demand from persons the change of value preferences. 
Surveys made in Europe point toward much more importance of cohort than of a lifecycle on 
changing value orientations (Scarbrough, 1995). Most often old values do not disappear at 
once but rather some parts of them disappear while others become incorporated in new values 
(Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995).  
 
Culture influences the way in which humans select, interpret, process and use information, at 
a great extent it determines pace at which the change of a value system may occur. In broad 
sense Georgia can be regarded as a country of traditional orthodox culture with strong 
collectivist component, that is culture, in which the self is defined in terms of belonging to a 
group or a community rather than of individual characteristics. It is a tight culture in many 
respects such as family rituals or public behaviour. Although families in urban areas are 
much smaller than in rural areas, kinship networks and mutual support continue to play 
significant role, both in assisting in the periods of hardship (it is interesting to observe sharply 
reduced divorce during economic crisis or among internally displaced persons/refugees), but 
also in developing clientelism and corruption. In general, communication in the community is 
much more emotional and personal, person is less alienated, which is probably characteristic 
for the whole Mediterranean world, to which Georgia certainly belongs from the viewpoint of 
its kinship structure and extravert behavioural (pride and honour) culture. It is interesting to 
note that extended kinship system partly cushions not only implications of economic crisis, 
but somehow softens the confrontation between the capital and the outer and poorer parts of 
the country, as every Georgian family in Tbilisi has well-rooted and well-functioning 
extended family relations in the countryside and other regions, operating often as barter or 
insurance system. These general cultural factors influence wide range of social and political 
behaviours. Values suggest whether individuals will actively seek out or avoid new ways of  
doing things. Indeed, current social changes bring more individualism and loose social 
control but more discipline in economic activities, with disruption of old collectivist values, 
ideology and patterns of economic organisation, but inertia and cultural lag slow the tempo of 
change. For many people, the need to behave the same way as they have always behaved is 
central to their values. Traditionalism, respect of the authority, are still highly valued in such 
a culture, and along with other cultural characteristics, define the direction and the pace of the 
transition process. Tradition-directed groups value security and sustenance - by nature, they 
are static communities that change with difficulty. Economic change stressed the importance 
of value characteristic to individualistic cultures.  
 
Qualities linked to different value orientations find their explicit expression also in the 
political institutions and behaviour, such as for instance are political parties and partisanship. 
Prevailing principles of party building take place not around the ideology or interest groups, 
which are not yet structured in Georgia, but around the personal networks and trust to the 
leaders, which at certain degree hinders establishment of traditional democratic values. 
Culturally highly valued respect to the authority coupled with the long totalitarian tradition of 
obedience as well as long exposure to double standards, difference between what was 
pronounced and what was is in fact exercised, low accountability of authorities to their words 
continue to dominate political reality. Such practices put more emphasis on personal trust to a 
leader and not his or her expressed ideology or commitments. This accentuation of the 
personality of a leader instead of conceptualised values is recycled and perpetuated by 
political elite, thus knowingly or unknowingly hindering further the development of 
democracy. 
 
As Ronald Ingelhart has stated, “different societies are characterised to very different degrees 
by a specific syndromes of political cultural attitudes; ... these cultural differences are 
relatively enduring but not immutable; and they have major political consequences, being 
closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions. ... The study of political culture is 
based on the assumption that autonomous and reasonably enduring cross-cultural differences 
exist and that they can have important political consequences.” (Ingelhart, 1988, pp. 1203-
1205). Values form an integral part of political culture, the latter in its turn is in fact an 
essential part of the general culture. Political cultural attitudes are superimposed on the 
system of traditional values shared by given society, and though slow in change this is the 
system through which a society adapts to its environment. Changes in the conditions, in 
which human beings find themselves, especially radical shifts in institutions and policies, 
eventually will cause corresponding changes in their outlook, attitudes, preferences and 
behaviour. During transition, parts of values, which are more deeply rooted, probably take 
longer to change despite the new needs created in the society or/and in the individual.  
 
Values are critically re-appraised in a period of transition, and indeed, a large number of 
people in Georgia are currently in the midst of profound change in basic values. Long-held 
beliefs about the meaning of state in one’s life, relations between the former member-states 
of the same giant empire, expectations for the future – indeed, about many aspects of daily 
living and important relationships among people – are undergoing a re-examination and 
reappraisal. The majority is hovering between older faiths in expanding horizons, and a new 
sense of lowered expectations, apprehension about the future, mistrust of institutions, and a 
growing sense of limits. People are in search of new rules, because the old rules don’t work 
any more, they are in the midst of fundamental reordering of the way they see the world 
around them. 
Today analytic primacy of values in explanations of political change (Van Deth, Scarbrough 
1995) is widely recognised. At the simplest, most direct level, shifts in value orientations 
induce change in modes and levels of political involvement. However, study of values is 
associated with certain difficulties as values are not directly observable. They often operate as 
high order norms and stay beyond the scope of rationality (Moscovici & Doise, 1994). Values 
are often presumed as underling declared goals. Smooth functioning of a society is 
considerably determined by the extent to which its members share values (Seliktar, 1986). To 
obtain popular support parties and their leaders should appeal to the prevalent in the society 
values or foster new values based on the needs of society. That kind of appeal is crystallised 
during the elections. Electorate programs reflect the parties’ goals and hence provide 
possibility to discern their values. This way electoral programmes provide good possibility 
for the study of values.  
 
As a new democracy, which emerged from a long period of totalitarian regime, Georgia 
provides a good opportunity to study the process of transformation, to trace the changes in 
value orientations and in perception of political and economic environment of the population. 
Besides purely cognitive function knowledge of the process could contribute to the building 
an effective policy for increase of democracy, acknowledgement of supremacy of democratic 
values. There are many contradictory perceptions among Georgians regarding their political 
preferences, orientations and identity, their country and its role in the world. This makes it 
difficult to determine which values are the more influential, but a number of dichotomies can 
be revealed. So, recently S. F. Jones questioned some Georgian self-perceptions and external 
orientations. “Is it Georgia as modern and Western or Georgia as traditional and Eastern? 
Both views are often expressed by Georgians. Similarly, is it Georgia as imperial victim or as 
former great imperial power; Georgia as innately democratic, or Georgia in need of a strong 
hand; Georgia as a tolerant multiethnic state, or Georgia for ethnic Georgians; Georgia as an 
independent state or Georgia as a state in need of protection. Which one is authentic and 
“operational” is hard to decide.” (Jones, 1999) While Georgia is slowly progressing on its 
way to development and democracy, following the hardship of civil unrest and economic 
catastrophe of early 1990s, various groups of population show different level of political 
involvement and activity. There is a great gap between the populations of three bigger cities, 
such as Tbilisi, Batumi and Kutaisi, on one hand, and the population of remote rural and 
mountainous areas and inhabitants of smaller provincial towns on the other. Equally, ethnic 
minorities living in quasi-state formations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also in 
southern provinces of Georgia, either deliberately or unwillingly are isolated from 
mainstream political processes taking place in the capital. However, there is also a gap 
between political élites, actively involved in governance or directing opposition politics, and 
the population at large, emotionally concerned but lacking skills and levers for more political 
participation. 
 
As mentioned above, voting is the scene where both public participation in political process 
takes place and where political élites compete among one another for influence and 
domination. “Voting is the key mechanism of consensus in democratic society. Students of 
elections are concerned with the relationships between one type of cleavage – political parties 
– and such other types as class, occupation, religion, ethnic group, and region, and the role 
these factors play as the social basis of political strife. … It is important for the stability of 
political system, that all major political parties include supporters from many segments of the 
population, as if their public support corresponds too closely to basic social, ethnic or 
regional divisions, as this happened in the past, this may undermine the democratic basis of 
the society due to intensification of conflict that rules out compromise. It may even happen,  
that too high political participation, commonly welcomed by students of democratic 
transition, may indicate towards increased cleavage, decline of social cohesion and hence the 
breakdown of normal democratic process” (Lipset, 1960, p. 12). 
 
Successful and enduring democratic practice depends on the high estimation of democratic 
values both by people in power and general public. Below we will discuss the findings 
regarding value orientations of political elite and citizens based on existing sociological data 
and our five studies, i.e. surveys of 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections, content analyses 
of electorate programs of parties in 1995 and 1999, and survey of 2000 presidential elections. 
 
 
POLITICAL ÉLITES AND PARTIES IN ELECTIONS 
 
There is a multitude of viewpoints with regards to the role of élites and/or masses in political 
processes that will never bring any final solution, but there is nevertheless no doubt that 
political élites do play an important role. As Converse and Pierce note, comparing the 
structure of elite and mass preferences is “absolutely central to the study of political 
representation, since this process obliges a representative to perceive and understand the 
policy sentiments of his constituents and somehow to take them into account, along with his 
own judgements of policy options” (1986, p.226). Accordingly, content analysis of the 
electorate programs of leading political parties is analysed in order to reveal value 
orientations: towards security, building a strong state integrated in the world, enhancing 
democratic values through striving towards personal freedom and equality, broadening 
relationships with Caucasian countries, etc. It is assumed that finding an ideological and 
conceptual alternative to communism still continues to be an organising principle for most 
political parties, supplemented by attitudes towards external orientations and individualities 
of personal leadership. On the issue of collective decision-making procedures and 
participation, these often put little faith in pluralism and democratic approach in their internal 
policies, revealing strong authoritarian inclinations. Whatever their deficiencies, these 
political movements will play a continued role in the evolution of public attitudes, shifting 
political spectrum in one or another direction, and influencing the makeup of the ruling 
coalitions. To get the popular support political parties should allude to the values that citizens 
hold and this should be reflected in their electorate programs. The main thesis is that the 
political orientations can be mapped onto types of value orientations, through a values 
content analysis of the writings of advocates of different political orientations (Rokeach, 
1973). Social values have been successfully used to predict support for different political 
parties, political leaders and social policies.  
 
Communication messages and their assumed effect on people’s attitudes, interpretations, 
beliefs and behaviours, stimulate emotions and present moral standards. However, the effects 
– powerful or limited - of representation of this or that political ideology or thesis through 
mass media are contingent on a variety of factors and conditions (Braithwaite, 1994). We 
compare the results of 1995 with the similar analysis of electorate programs of the leading 
parties in 1999 elections in order to obtain indications on the dynamics of political thinking. 
Our data analysed in quantitative content analysis describe what are the typical patterns or 
characteristics of self-presentation by leading political parties, and identify important 
relationships among the variables measured. Analysis is restricted to value orientations as 
expressed in programme documents of political blocks before elections, and hence reflect not 
only the value orientation of respective party leadership, but also their electoral strategy and 
idea of mass expectations in an attempt to maximise supportive vote. 
PARLIAMENTARY ELLECTIONS OF 1995: PARTY PROGRAMMES 
 
According to the results of the parliamentary elections of November 5, 1995 by party lists, 
three parties got seats in the 235 seat parliament: The Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG)-91 
seats, National Democratic Party (NDP) - 31 seats, the Georgian Union of Revival-25 seats. 
Thus, 62.5% of party seats went to three parties, i.e. 38.7% to the Citizens' Union of Georgia, 
13.2% to the National Democratic Party and 10.6% to the Georgian Union of Revival (SWB, 
1995).  
 
The electoral programmes of the Citizens' Union of Georgia (Shevardnadze, 1995) and the 
National Democratic Party (National Democratic Party, 1995) has been content analysed. The 
programme of the Georgian Union of Revival has not been studied at that time as the public 
support base for the party was restricted to only one region – the party got almost all of its 
votes in the Autonomous Republic of Ajara. Content analyses of the electoral programmes 
demonstrated the differences between the two parties in two major spheres, i.e. in social 
values and in orientation toward the outer world. 
 
a). Social values 
 
Different value orientations as reflected in the programs can be labelled as ‘National security 
and order’ versus ‘Freedom and equality’. The programme of the Citizens' Union of Georgia 
is conveying the image of a strong state, underlying the importance of order and such 
instruments of state as constitution and ruling. Emphasis is put on economic strength, 
reforms, investments, and support for business and creation of a middle class. Persons are 
mainly referred to as the collective entities and the words ‘people’, ‘population’, and 
‘electorate’ are mostly used. 
The program of National Democrats stressed the party’s orientation to the person, by mostly 
using the words: ‘person’, ‘individual’ and ‘citizen’. In the program there are frequent 
references to freedom, rights and responsibilities of individuals, equality and solidarity. The 
importance of social secu-rity is emphasised. While referring to Georgia, the word ‘republic’ 
rather than the ‘state’ is used. Words reflecting the main value orientations of the parties are 
presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY ELLECTIONS OF 1995: PARTY PROGRAMMES 
 
According to the results of the parliamentary elections of November 5, 1995 by party lists, 
three parties got seats in the 235 seat parliament: The Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG)-91 
seats, National Democratic Party (NDP) - 31 seats, the Georgian Union of Revival-25 seats. 
Thus, 62.5% of party seats went to three parties, i.e. 38.7% to the Citizens' Union of Georgia, 
13.2% to the National Democratic Party and 10.6% to the Georgian Union of Revival (SWB, 
1995).  
The electoral programmes of the Citizens' Union of Georgia (Shevardnadze, 1995) and the 
National Democratic Party (National Democratic Party, 1995) has been content analysed. The 
programme of the Georgian Union of Revival has not been studied at that time as the public 
support base for the party was restricted to only one region – the party got almost all of its 
votes in the Autonomous Republic of Ajara. Content analyses of the electoral programmes 
demonstrated the differences between the two parties in two major spheres, i.e. in social 
values and in orientation toward the outer world. 
a). Social values 
 
Different value orientations as reflected in the programs can be labelled as ‘National security 
and order’ versus ‘Freedom and equality’. The programme of the Citizens' Union of Georgia 
is conveying the image of a strong state, underlying the importance of order and such 
instruments of state as constitution and ruling. Emphasis is put on economic strength, 
reforms, investments, and support for business and creation of a middle class. Persons are 
mainly referred to as the collective entities and the words ‘people’, ‘population’, and 
‘electorate’ are mostly used. 
 
The program of National Democrats stressed the party’s orientation to the person, by mostly 
using the words: ‘person’, ‘individual’ and ‘citizen’. In the program there are frequent 
references to freedom, rights and responsibilities of individuals, equality and solidarity. The 
importance of social secu-rity is emphasised. While referring to Georgia, the word ‘republic’ 
rather than the ‘state’ is used. Words reflecting the main value orientations of the parties are 





b). Orientation toward the outer world 
 
The two parties differed greatly in their orientation toward other countries, country alliances 
and international organisations. The Citizen’s Union stressed the ties with international 
organisations, with the world in general and the developed countries, CIS countries, 






It can be concluded that that back in 1995 the two of the three (as Georgian Union of Revival 
was at that time actually a party with only regional – in Ajara – support) parliamentary parties 
reflect two views: Citizens' Union of Georgia, the majority party, adhered to the idea of a 
strong state integrated in the world and the National Democrats promoted the idea of personal 
freedom, equality and consolidation with the immediate neighbouring to Georgia countries. 
Programme of the Citizens' Union of Georgia seemed to find answers to the problems of an 
existing situation and meet the needs of two different segments of the population: a) Persons, 
probably mostly representing the older generation, who encountered difficulties in finding a 
place in a new economic system with nostalgic feelings for the minimal security provided by 
the communist rule; and b) Younger generation, which sees more possibilities in the future 
for self-realisation and achievement. Thus frequent allusions to order on the one hand and 
entrepreneurship, abandonment of equality principles and integration in the world economy  
on the other should have served the purpose of establishment of the feeling of security for 
both groups. The programme of the National Democrats seems to be more abstract, less 
bound to the situation. It put more emphasis on ideology, fitting in the framework of basic 
values of socialism with the emphasis on individual freedom, patriotism and equality.  
 
 
PARLIAMENTAR ELECTIONS OF 1999: PARTY PROGRAMMES 
 
On October 31, 1999, three parties got the seats in the Parliament as a result of elections by 
party lists. The Citizens' Union of Georgia – 42% of vote, electoral block Union of Georgian 
Revival – 26 % of vote and electorate block Industry Will Save Georgia (ISG) – 7% of vote. 
None of them published an electoral programme as such. The Citizens' Union of Georgia 
published a manifesto and Industry Will Save Georgia issued a document where it discussed 
the main objectives of the block. To our knowledge, the member parties of the Revival block 
have not published any joint document reflecting the programmatic aims of the block. The 
founding party of the block - Georgian Union of Revival – has issued a booklet describing 
achievements of the party and its aspirations. The manifesto of Citizens' Union of Georgia 
and the party document of Industry Will Save Georgia were content analysed. Although 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) failed to get any seats in the parliament their electorate 
brochure was also analysed mainly for the comparison with the 1995 programme of the 
founders of the block, i.e. National Democratic Party. 
 
The list of key words consisting of 78 units was complied. The frequencies of key words 
were counted in all the documents. The frequencies then were normalised according to the 
length of the texts. The differences in the usage of words by different parties and the 1995 
and 1999 programmes of the same parties were calculated. 
 
In the Manifesto of the Citizens' Union of Georgia the close association of the President of 
Georgia with the party is continuously stressed. Manifesto consists of four parts: General, 
description of the current situation, achievements of the party during the four-year period, 
and the vision of the future. Self-criticism, acknowledgement of the problems that Georgia is 




Structure of the CUG Manifesto, 1999 
 
Among the most acute problems are named territorial disintegration, problems of the 
displaced population, taxation, unemployment and small salaries, provision of healthcare 
services. The Manifesto points to the achievement of the party in building the state, Georgia’s 
becoming the member of the European Council, introduction and stability of the national 
currency, establishing of control over the borders, adoption of a significant number of good 
laws, effective land privatisation, revival of industry and agriculture, achievements in 
technology, formation of civic society, and judicial reform. Document stresses the continuity 
of democratic governance under its rule and the capability of CUG to bring Georgia to 
prosperity through economic development. The link is drawn between progress in economic 
prospects and orientation toward Europe as the main issue of foreign policy. The Manifesto 





Most frequently used words in the document of CUG, 1999 
*Georgia in the name of the party was not counted 
Compared to 1995 electorate programme there is an evident shift of accent from international 
politics to internal affairs. The frequency of words demonstrate that the party is mostly 
concerned with economic issues and the world at large rather than specific countries or 





Difference in frequencies of word usage in CUG programmes of 1995 and 1999 
The right part of the diagram shows the increase in usage from 1995 to 1999, while the left - its decrease 
 
The programme document of the Industry will Save Georgia block names the parties united 
in the block, i.e. Industry will Save Georgia, The Movement for Georgian State, The Union 
of Reformers and Agrarians, Georgia First of All, Sporting Georgia, New Georgia. The 
document contains three parts. In the first part the general orientation of the block and the 
critics of the politics of ruling party are presented. It is stressed that in the block there are 
united people with experience of working in production sphere, who are able even in difficult 
situation to achieve success. Success and the ability to achieve the goals are underlined 
throughout the document. Revival of economy, reduction of unemployment, overcoming 
corruption and carrying out effective politics that could ensure the reestablishment of 
territorial integrity are named as the major goals of the block. Criticism toward the ruling 
party is not lengthily and occupies only 4.5% of the document. It mostly refers to the latter’s 
inability to combat poverty and corruption, and to the loss of territories due to deficient 
policies. In the second part of the document the actions are listed that the block intended to 
carry out if in power. They mostly concern economy, social security and regaining the 
territories. The last part contains a list of expected positive outcomes, and it emphasises the 




Structure of the ISG document, 1999 
The ISG document contains 1470 words.  
 
The most frequently used words are presented in Figure 8: 
Figure 8 
 
Most frequently used words in the document of ISG, 1999 
 
Difference between the frequency of words used by Citizens' Union of Georgia and Industry 
will Save Georgia was most obvious in the use of words "Georgia", "world" and “national’, 
CUG using them more often and "economics", "politics" and “social”, which were used by 




Differences in the frequency of words used by CUG and ISG 
The right part of the diagram shows more frequent usage by CUG, while the left - by ISG 
 
Electoral programme of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) lists the parties which are 
united in it, i.e. the National-Democratic Party, the Republican Party and the Union of 
Industrialists. The document points that the block offers the society the third way, different 
from those proposed by their two powerful rivals - the CUG and the Georgian Revival, the 
way that will bring better life to the nation. The block sees itself as the only power that can 
cushion the clash between the CUG and the Revival supporters. Next to the general section, 
the document has separate sections describing proposed political arrangement, territorial 
arrangement, development in army building, economy, energy sector, land ownership, 




Structure of the NDA document 
 
Each part begins with the criticism of politics of CUG and ends with the NDA view of the 
sphere, so that the critical part occupies almost one third of the whole text. The document 




Most frequently used words in the NDA document, 1999 
 
Difference between the frequency of words used by Citizens' Union of Georgia and National 
Democratic Alliance was revealed in the use of the words: "state", "enterprise" and “law”, 
NDA using them more often, and the words “Georgia”, "economics" and "world", which 
were used more frequently by the CUG. 
Figure 12 
 
Differences in the frequency of words used by CUG and NDA 
 
The right part of the diagram shows more frequent usage by CUG, while the left - by NDA 
NDA also differs in its orientation from ISG. NDA, as is evident from Table 1, refers more 
often than ISG to ‘Georgia’ and ‘state’, while ISG puts more emphasis on ‘economy’ 
 
Table 1: Difference in the frequency of words used by NDA and ISG 
 
Rank Word Difference in 
frequency 
1 Georgia 16 
2 Economics 14 * 




5.5 Person 5 
5.5 Politics 5* 
8.5 People 3* 
8.5 Social 3 
8.5 Foreign 3 
8.5 historical 3 
*ISG using the word more often 
 
The comparison of the election documents of the NDP in 1995 and the 1999 NDA 
programme reveals the change in accents. If earlier the National Democratic Party, urged a 
quasi-theocracy in which the church would “play a leading role in moral questions 
concerning the nation’s life”, its current rules declare the party simply “loyal to the Orthodox 
values of the Mother Church.” (National Democratic Party Rules, 1996) Similar to the CUG 
programme the difference first of all is evident in the shift from outer to inner problems. In 
1999 program other countries and international organisations in fact are not mentioned. 
Besides NDA in 1999 put much more emphasis on economic issues and on state building. 
Table 2 
Differences in frequency in programs of NDP, 1995 and NDA, 1999 
Rank Word Difference in 
frequency 
1 CIS countries 15.75 
2 Economics 15 
3 State 12* 
4 Politics 11 
5.5 Person 9 
5.5 All countries except CIS 
countries 
9 
7 Democracy 8.75 
9 Entrepreneurship 8.50* 
10 Power 7.50 
*NDA in 1999 using the word more often 
 
In general, the program of CUG was the most optimistic and detailed, and the least offensive 
against political opponents, it stressed the ideas of continuity, building prosperity, 
responsibility of its members and its positive experience of governance. It declared the 
priority of economic issues. There were no references in the programme to Russia or any 
other CIS country, while the references to outer world were restricted mainly to less-
differentiated allusions to the world and Europe, also the World Trade Organisation and the 
European Council. 
 
Like the CUG document, the ISG document also conveys optimism and determination of its 
members. It is more businesslike and precise than the CUG manifesto or the NDA document. 
NDA built its election campaign on the criticism, on the fact that the current situation was 
unbearable and that CUG was unable to solve the country’s problems. It is a rather 
pessimistic document where no ways for implementation of any constructive, positive vision 




Proportion of criticism in party documents, 1999 
Social and Political value orientations 
 
Studying the hierarchy of the political values of the population is another important aspect of 
studying political culture, as values shared by the population are by no means of less 
importance than values of the political elite. The research goal of the study was to develop a 
set of value items that reflected the way in which the adult population saw their world in 
political perspective. Values represent only one component of a person’s ideology and there 
is no reason to assume that values share the complexity of organisation found among more 
specific beliefs and attitudes, but nevertheless they dominate in defining political behaviour.  
 
As we know in advance, social and political attitudes of the population in a transitional 
society may lack coherence and stability, and this was confirmed by the empirical data that 
we obtained. Social values tend to be based on the same highly valued goal, labelled 
commonly as “a world at peace”. However, some see this goal as being achieved through 
international harmony and equality, some through national strength and order, and some 
through both value orientations. Independent and complex value orientations may map into a 
single left-right political dimension comprising social attitudes, voting behaviour, and 
political activism, due to distinction between the way in which individuals think about their 
world and the way dominant political institutions allow them to express their ideas in the 
world of action. 
 
Again, elections were at the focus of our study, as they have special features making them 
especially important in studying political preferences. Institutional and legal settings within 
the time span between the two main parliamentary elections of 1995 and 1999 did 
significantly vary. However, relative political stability during this period, as well as the 
general ubiquity and the normative status of elections as a political event separates these 
voting experiences from other forms of political participation, especially in the aftermath of a 
temporary rise of unconventional types of political action that dominated the scene during the 
first years immediately after the declaration of independence. Indeed, participation, defined 
as an “activity that has an intent or effect of influencing government action-either directly by 
affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the 
selection of people who make those policies” (Verba, Schlozman & Brady; 1995. p.38) can 
be considered as a part of political culture and a main mechanism of democracy. Even in case 
of the elementary, the least demanding procedure of participation as is voting, the degree of 
participation of citizens dramatically declines. The decline is observed rather than statistically 
supported, but the growing, from election to election, criticism by local and international 
observers mainly concerns rigging of vote and reporting much high than an actual turnout. 
On the background of official nearly 70% turnout at 2000 presidential elections, our 45% of 
sample having expressed readiness to vote looks characteristic. 
 
At the same time, in attempting to describe that particular version of human behaviour 
considered as characteristic for contemporary Georgia, and showing how political behaviour 
such as voting may be referred to respective characteristics, there is understanding that the 
behavioural patterns of the Georgian (Tbilisi) population are not solely self-generated and but 
are responsive to and influenced by political events in the outside world. It may be useful to 
recall some general sociological data from other previous studies. So, in 1995 and 1996, 
population samples from 20 Central and Eastern European countries were interviewed in the  
framework of the European Union’s annual EUROBAROMETER public opinion survey, in 
order to assess public attitudes towards the EU, and the political and economic climate in the 
region. Six CIS states were involved in the survey: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Georgian population demonstrated reasonable but comparatively 
higher optimism among other CIS countries, and the orientation towards democracy and free 
market development. There was a small decline in some of these indicators during year 1998 
when the survey was carried out in Georgia. Among six CIS countries Georgia expressed all 
these years more positive view on the development of household finances. So, in 1996, 27% 
were believing that the situation has improved, 28% saying that it stayed the same and 44% 
stating that their household finances got worse, but the situation seemed to be much better 
last year (39% better, 23% worse). Market economy had greatest support in Georgia, while in 
other CIS countries there were more people opposed to market economy than there were in 
favour of it. This model seemed more acceptable to Georgian’s mentality as an influence of 





In 1996 Georgians expressed the highest level of satisfaction with democracy 
among CIS countries were the satisfaction was generally low, as there were
40% satisfied against 56% dissatisfied (compare to 8% against 80% in Russia).
As mentioned above, there was a small fall in satisfaction from 43% in 1995, 
but the trend was not supported by later data. There was also greater optimism
regarding respect for human rights in its country among Georgian people in
comparison with other CIS countries. Although 59% thought in 1996 that
human rights were not respected, there was a certain trend towards the
improvement of the situation (62% against 34% respectively in 1995), while
e.g. Russia expressed highest dissatisfaction in respect of human rights (82% -
not respected). At the same time, opinions about the direction of how things 
were going in the country had changed in Georgia from 45% in 1995 to 39% in
1996 (right) and from 32% to 54% (wrong), this shift partly explained by
failed high expectations after the 1995 elections and the invisibility of positive
changes to common people. 
 Figure 15 
 
 
An important political event in the period between the two parliamentary elections of 1995 
and 1999 was the local elections held on November 15th, 1998. One of the greatest surprises 
in these elections was the success of two - the Labour and the Socialist parties, both of which 
campaigned against Western economic models. This was accompanied by the growth of 
strong industrial lobbies opposed to IMF policies, the resistance of the orthodox church to 
Western faiths and its withdrawal from the World Council of Churches, and some 
parliamentarians’ protests against Western cultural imperialism. There are many possible 
explanations for this success, followed by total failure in 1999 parliamentary elections of both 
parties, but one is clear, there is significant potential for anti-western and anti-democratic 
choice, reflecting as well a strand of “indigenism” that cannot be ignored. Still, success of 
populist rhetoric used by both Labourists and Socialists in promising social security, free 
education and state protection and patronage, shows the readiness of the population to 
provide credit of confidence to political forces that offer pseudo-constructive ideas close to 
deeply rooted political preferences brought as ideological legacy of Soviet past. Important 
material for comparison was provided by our surveys carried out close to the parliamentary 
elections of 1995 and 1999(data comparison presented below). 
 
The surveys of 1995 and 1999 
 
The 1995 survey was held a week before and 1999 one week after the respective 
parliamentary elections. They comprised several identical blocks and taped value orientation 
of respondents, participation of respondents in the elections, respondents’ political 
preferences, and the reasons for voting (or in the case of non-participation in elections - 
causes for abstention).  
 
The 1995 survey was held on 335 respondents (210 male and 145 female) and 1999 on 416 
respondents (208 male and 208 female) of four age groups in the age range of 15-75. 
Majority of respondents of both studies had University education, finished or unfinished.  
Social values were studied by the Social Goals Inventory scale (Braithwaite, 1994), 
containing 14 items forming two 7-point sub-scales: ‘International harmony and equality’; 
and ‘National strength and order’. ‘National strength and order’ was evaluated by 
respondents much higher (M=6.67 in 1995 and M=6.77 in 1999) than ‘International harmony 
and equality’ (M=5.43 in 1995 and M=5.75 in 1999). Three of four items comprising 
‘National strength’ scale occupy first three ranks according to the estimations given by 
respondents, these are: ‘National greatness’, ‘National security’ and the ‘Rule of law’. 
Comparing the data with the results of 1995 survey reveals essentially similar ordering of 
different social goals in accordance to their importance. 
 
Table 3 














National strength and order       
National greatness 1.5 1 6.39 1.03 6.75 .61 
The rule of law 1.5 3 6.39 .99 6.67 .71 
National security 3 2 6.35 1.00 6.74 .64 
National economic development 4.5 6 6.23 1.03 6.54 .81 
International harmony and 
equality 
      
A world at peace 4.5 4 6.23 1.14 6.62 .87 
Preserving natural environment 6 5 6.20 1.07 6.55 .80 
Human dignity 7 7 5.97 1.36 6.22 1.21 
A world of beauty 8 9 5.92 1.10 6.06 1.06 
Social progress and social reform 9 8 5.68 1.19 6.15 1.11 
A good life for others 10 10 5.58 1.30 6.01 1.15 
Equal opportunity for all 11 13 5.17 1.63 5.11 1.83 
International cooperation 12 11 5.12 1.35 5.72 1.26 
Greater economic equality 13 12 4.83 1.57 5.36 1.54 





Evaluations of Social Goals Inventory in 1995 and in 1999 
 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant difference on both ‘International 
Harmony’ (F=25.6, p<.01) and ‘National security’ (F=33.4, p<.01) scales between 1995 and 
1999 data. In 1995 ANOVA revealed the influence of the age on the estimation of the 
importance of National security and order (F=2.67; p< .05). Oldest (M=6.43) and than 
youngest (M=6.41) respondents estimated National strength and order the highest. 18-26 
years old respondents valued National strength the least (M=6.19). New data do not 
differentiate age groups in regard to these value orientations and therefore points to the 
decrease of age-related polarisation as well as the increase of importance of social goals 
 
Value orientation. Value orientations were measured by Materialist/Post-materialist values 
scale (Inglehart, 1977) – 4-item instrument of a forced choice format measuring adherence to 
materialist or post-materialist values. The scale was administered only in 1999 survey. 
 
Respondents were requested to indicate their first and the second priorities from a scale 
comprising of four items of materialist/post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977). Two items 
of the scale correspond to materialist (‘maintain order in the nation’ and ‘fight rising prices’), 
and the other two to post-materialist orientation (‘give people more say in government 
decisions’ and ‘protect freedom of speech’). Accordingly following their choices respondents 
can be grouped in having materialist, post-materialist or mixed orientation, i.e. having chosen 
one materialist and one post-materialist item. Figure 17 demonstrates high frequency of 
choices of the items comprising materialist orientation. 
Figure 17  




Thus, respondents of mixed value orientation form the biggest group, followed by persons 
with materialist orientation. The group of persons with post-materialist orientation is very 
small, comprising only 4.9% of the sample. 
 
Persons with mixed type of value orientation are most numerous in all age groups. Age exerts 
influence on value orientation (chi-square = 19.2, p<01). There is a prevalence of persons in 
age-range 41-76 among materialist orientation type (30.6% of all materialists), prevalence of 
persons in age brake of 26-40 among post materialists (50% of all post-materialists) and 
prevalence of youngest respondents, i.e. of 15-17 years olds among persons with mixed 
orientation (29.8%). 
 
Among the supporters of CUG and the Union of Georgian Revival materialists form the 
largest group comprising 50.8% and 55% of the party supporters correspondingly, while 
among those who did not cast their vote, supporters of Industry will save Georgia and all 
other parties (62.1%, 54.5% and 52.2% correspondingly) persons with mixed value 
orientation form the biggest group. 
 
Attitude towards democracy and democratic values. Attitude towards democracy scale 
(Whitefield & Evans, 1966) measuring attitude towards main democratic principles has been 
developed originally for the study of attitudes toward main democratic principles in Russia. 
Instrument measures abstract values, in fact normative orientation of a person. In the survey 
five out of seven original Whitefield & Evans questions and a 7-point measuring scale were 
used. The authors of the scale do not make a composite measure of the scale by summing up 
the answers of its items. Instrument was used only in 1999 study. As is evident from Table 4, 
democratic values are not valued very high. Only the statement “It is not conceivable to have 
a viable democracy without political opposition” is estimated highly and stands out from 
other items with much lower estimations. Taken together attitude of the surveyed population 
is rather traditionalist, honoring authority and valuing solving the problems facing the 
country. 
Table 4 
Estimation on attitudes towards democracy 
 Item Mean SD 
 It is not conceivable to have a viable democracy without political 
opposition 
5.21 1.42
 People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against 
government 
3.74 1.79
 Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be allowed to 
stand in general elections 
2.57 1.68
* It would be worthwhile to support a leader who could solve the main 
problems facing country today even if he overthrew democracy 
3.85 1.85
* The political opposition should not only criticise the government, but 
support it as well 
4.46 1.53
* Disagreement to the item is a measure of a democratic attitude. 
 
ANOVA revealed that the age groups differ significantly only in regard of one item, namely 
“The political opposition should not only criticise the government, but support it as well” 
(F=2.8, p<05) youngest group of respondents showing the least compliance to the statement 
and this way expressing more democratic attitude (M=4.25, SD=1.52) while 40-75 years olds 
showed the most compliance (M=4.82, SD=1.56). ANOVA also revealed the difference 
among supporters of different parties in regard to democratic values. Significant difference 
was found in regard to two statements: Supporters of parties left outside the parliament 
estimating the item “People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against 
the government” the highest (F=4.4, p<.01; M=4.12, SD=1.76) while least democratic 
attitude was expressed by CUG electorate (M=2.93, SD=1.53). The second statement on 
which significant difference was found (F=3.5, p<.01) is “The political opposition should not 
only criticise the government, but support it as well”. Here most democratic attitude was 
expressed by those who did not cast their vote (M=4.15, SD=1.55), while the least democratic 
by supporters of CUG (M=5.05, SD=1.38). 
 
Population seems to be ready to sacrifice democratic achievements in exchange to security 
and minimum life-standards. The attitude is also defined by own representation in the 
parliament. Supporters of majority in the parliament do not want to give opposition 




Democratic preferences were again studied only in 1999 on the basis of seven pairs of 
alternative items. Questions have been designed specially for the given survey in a forced 
choice format to tap democratic values, such as personal freedom, equality, and rule of law. 
Respondents were asked to choose one, more important value from each pair. 
Table 5. Percentage of choices 
 
No Item %, N=416 
1  Order in the country 77.1 
* Personal freedom 22.9 
 Total 100 
2 * Participation of population in decision making 52.3 
 Trusting leadership in making decisions 47.7 
 Total 100 
3 Defence of territorial integrity at any price 69.7 
* Avoidance of bloodshed, even at the price territorial 
integrity 
30.3 
 Total 100 
4 * Support of private entrepreneurship 29.6 
 Social security of population 70.4 
 Total 100 
5 Preferable conditions for Georgians in Georgia 65.2 
* Equality for the representatives of all nations in Georgia 34.8 
 Total 100 
6 * Equality in regard to law 93.7 
 Granting privileges for special services 6.3 
 Total 100 
7 * Civic responsibilities 90.0 
 Granting privileges to relatives and friends in business and 
civic life 
10.0 
 Total 100 
* items expressing democratic preference 
 
As is demonstrated in Table 5, out of seven pairs of items preference was expressed by the 
majority only to three democratic values, one regarding participation (item 2) and two (items 
6 and 7) directed against corruption and nepotism. In these last two cases significant age 
difference were found (Chi-square = 8, p < .05). 
 
In regard to both, equality before the law and civic responsibility among age groups more 41-
70 years olds and less - 14-17 years olds showed democratic preference. 25.9% of choices 
were made by 41-70 years olds and 24.1% by 15-17 years olds for item 6 and 26.4% of 
choices were made by 41-70 years olds and 23.8% by 15-17 years olds for item 7. 
 
After items 6 and 7 respondents were most unanimous in choosing order in the country 
(77.1%) over personal freedom (Item 1). Social security was preferred over the support of 
private entrepreneurship (70.4%, item 4). Here the age difference was significant (Chi-square 
= 15.4, p < .05). Social security was advocated by 15-17 years olds much more (29%) than by 
other age groups. Least preference was demonstrated by 41-75 years olds. Their choice 
constituted only 20% of all choices for this issue. 
National sentiment was less pronounced (items 3 and 5). Significant difference among the 
age groups was found in choosing defence of territorial integrity at any price over avoidance 
of bloodshed even at the expense of territorial integrity. Territorial integrity was the most 
valued for 26-40 years olds (79.6%). 
 
In general the scarcity of democratic preferences, high need for equality in regard to law and 
in occupational opportunities, low need for participation, and valuing of order were the 
demonstrated trends within the sample. 
 
Motives for voting and not voting.  
 
From the surveyed populations, persons under 18 years of age were excluded from the 
analyses as were not entitled to take part in elections due to their age. Regarding voting the 
biggest group was formed of those, who either: did not take part in elections, did not cast 
their vote to any party, or did not reveal their choice. We call this group no-preference group. 
They constitute 38.9% in 1995 and 33.8% in 1999 of eligible sample. In all age groups the 
biggest is the proportion of this, no preference group. Next to it the most widespread answer 
varies across the age groups. In 1999 22.4% of 18-25 years olds and 23.5% of respondents in 
the age range of 41-76 expressed preference to the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG), 29.4% 
of 26-40 year olds - to the parties, which were left outside the parliament.  
 
From the perspective of the party preferences in 1999 the CUG supporters in our sample are 
mostly formed by 18-25 and 41-76 years olds (39.3% each); Georgian Union of Revival 
(GUR) - by persons in the age range of 18-25 (45%), most numerous supporters of the 
Industry will save Georgia (ISG) are 41-76 years old (41.1%). As is demonstrated in Figure 
18 the three motives, i.e. ‘trust to the party leader’, fact that ‘others were even worse’ and 
‘ideas conveyed in the party programme’ were named as leading reasons for voting.  
 
 
Figure 18  
Reasons for making voting choice 
 
 
Both the supporters of CUG (45.9%) and GUR (40%) name trust to the leader as the main 
reason for making their choice, the second mostly wide spread motive for the supporters of 
both parties is the fact that other parties were even worse (26.2% of CUG supporters and 25% 
of GUR supporters). Different reason was prevalent for the supporters of ISG. The ideas 
conveyed in the program was the leading motive for 35.7% of ISG electorate. The second 
largest group here, similar to the cases of CUG and GUR, was formed by those whose voting 
was determined by the perception that the others were worse. These two motives, i.e. ideas 
expressed in the programme and the fact that others were worse were main reasons for  
making the choice (26.1% for each motive) among the supporters of the parties that failed to 
enter the Parliament. All in all 68 respondents or 16.3% of the sample out of those eligible to 
take part in elections did not vote. The leading motives for not voting were either unspecified 
or labelled as mistrust to the parties, while more than a quarter were discouraged from voting 
by the feeling that they could not influence the events. 
 
Figure 19  




Trust seems to be the leading factor in making both voting and not-voting decision, similarly 
trust to the leader was named as the main reason for making voting choice and mistrust to 
parties as the main motive for not voting. The point that the second most widely accepted 
motive for voting choice being ‘choosing the least evil’, and the feeling of helplessness as a 





Three questions in the 1999 survey were aimed at the study of the general orientation. One of 
them referred to the influence that an ordinary citizen could exert on the government to 
change the policy. Respondents are rather pessimistic in regard to the influence that an 
ordinary citizens and hence themselves can have on the government. There was a significant 
age difference in the evaluation of possibilities of exerting influence (Chi-square =27.5, 





The second general orientation question concerned the issue of having trust in others. 
Respondents do not consider that most of other people could be trusted. (M= 3.35 on 7-step 
scale ranging from 1-absolutely disagree to 7-absolutely agree SD=1.57). ANOVA revealed 
the influence of age on trust (F=2.96, p<.05). 41-76 years olds (M=3.73, SD=1.53) show the 
most and the 18-25 years olds (M=3.13, SD=1.59) the least trust in people. 
 
Respondents also do not express high satisfaction with their life. (M= 3.27, SD=1.75 on 7-
step scale ranging from 1 - absolutely dissatisfied, to 7 - absolutely satisfied). Among those 
who were eligible to vote, diffe-rence in degree of satisfaction was found between the 
supporters of different parties (F=3.67, p = .006 < .05). The most satisfied were the 
supporters of CUG (M=3.82, SD=1.72) and the least satisfied – the supporters of those 
parties which were left outside the parliament (M=2.70, SD=1.38).  
 
Perception of little control over decisions of government, little trust in others and low 
satisfaction with own life was the demonstrated trend. 
 
Attitude towards economic equality and estimations of present and future possibilities 
 
Other areas of interest include attitude towards economic equality and trust in reaching 
affluence through honest work. Attitude towards economic equality and estimation of 
possibilities of economic activities at present and in future were studied by questions with 
provided-answer options. Ideas of economic equality were not prevalent. Comparison with 
1995 data shows the shift towards the attitude of economic inequality, as while in 1999 more 
than half of respondents think that there should be rich and poor (Chi-square = 103.1,  
p < .001), back in 1995 only 46.5% favored existence of rich and poor, 31.6% advocated 




The majority of respondents label their families as neither effluent nor poor, while most of 
others considers themselves to be poor. There is a significant difference in labelling economic 
situation of the families (Chi-square = 75, p<001). Proportion of those who call their families 
poor increases with the age. Poor those who call their families poor 13.8% are 15-18 years 




Perception of economic status in 1999 
 
The situation was similar in 1995. At that time 53.8% considered their families as neither 
effluent nor poor, 42% called it poor and 4.2% called it rich.  
 
According to 1999 data, in recent 5 years the economic position of 46.1% of families 
worsened, 29.8% has not changed and 24.1% improved, while back in 1995 according to as 
much as 69% of respondents, the economic condition deteriorated, according to 21.1% it has 
not changed, and according to 10.4% it improved. Here again respondents of different age 
groups differ in the evaluation of a change (Chi-square = 38.9,  
p < .001).  
 
Proportion of those who state the improvement of the situation decreases with the age. From 
all those who point to the improvement 15-17 years olds constitute 37%, 18-25 years olds 
31%, 26-40 years olds 18% and 41-76 years olds 14%. There is also significant differences in 
the evaluation of changes in 1995 and in 1999 (Chi-square = 53, p < .001). In 1995 10.4% of 
the sample pointed to the improvement, while in 1999 already 24% sees the positive changes.  
Figure 23 
 
It is worth mentioning of a relatively recent study of the World Bank Poverty and Income 
Distribution study (World Bank 1999), which indicates that notwithstanding the financial 
crisis of the last year there is a tendency of slight improvement of the perception of 
wellbeing. Compare this also to the results of a relatively recent study, which indicate to the 
similar figures for the perception of wellbeing as ours: 
Table 6 
Changes in economic conditions of a 
family,  
as compared to the last year 
Number % 
00 4 1.3 
Improved 56 18.7 
The same 116 38.7 
Grew worse 124 41.3 
Total 300 100.0 
(Investigation of Corruption Problems in Georgia, 1998) 
 
In general, future outlook is rather optimistic. 67.5% of respondents expect the improvement 
of economic conditions of their families in coming 5 years, 26.6% thinks it would not change 
and according to 5.9% it will become worse. Age plays considerable part in the evaluation of 
future (Chi-square =57, p<.001). Again younger respondents look at the future with much 
more hope than older ones . Among those hoping for more affluent life 15-17 years olds 
constitute 30.1%, 18- 25 years olds 31.2%, 26-40 years olds 23% and 41-76 years olds 
15.7%.  
 
Majority of respondents (68.1%) considers it impossible to earn enough for decent life by 
honest work, only 10.9% think it possible and 21% cannot give definite answer. Age groups 
differ significantly in evaluation of present possibilities of achieving affluence through honest 
work (Chi-square =19.4, p<.01). Least convinced in such possibility are oldest respondents 
(29.1% of negative answers) and most convinced are 18-25 years olds (21.35% of negative 
answers). Evaluations of the present possibilities made in 1995 and in 1999 do not differ, 
while there is a considerable difference in evaluations of future prospects of earning enough 
by honest work (Chi-square =18.5, p<.05). As can be seen in Figure 21 a bigger proportion of 
1999 sample sees such opportunity in 5 years perspective. 22.2% of respondents think that in 
5 years it will be possible to earn by honest work enough for leading normal life, 21.2% do 
not consider this as a possibility and the biggest part of the respondents (56.6%) cannot give 
definite answer. Age does not make any difference in evaluation of future prospects. No 
difference was revealed while comparing evaluations of future, or of present possibilities to 
make livelihood through honest work, of 1995 and 1999 samples, but there is significant 
increase of optimism regarding future possibilities for honest life. There is certain 
improvement trend in perception of economic conditions of the families, and in the 
expectations of the future. There is also different labelling of economic conditions by 
different age groups, with more optimistic outlook in younger sample 
 
Figure 24 
Possibility of earning enough by honest work in 5 years 
 
Compare to the results of a study of corruption, indicating that more than half of the 
population accepts bribe and corruption as part of everyday life: 
 
Table 7 
Respondent’s opinion with regards to paying extra 
charges to the personnel of state institutions, in 
order to settle a problem 
Number % 
00 5 1.7 
It is necessary 30 10.0 
It is our home regime 3 1.0 
It is inadmissible 144 48.0 
It is possible in present circumstances 63 21.0 
When it is required 55 18.3 
Total 300 100.0 
(Investigation of Corruption Problems in Georgia, 1998) 
 
The results of the 1995 and 1999 surveys were supplemented by our latest survey focused on 
the population of the capital city of Tbilisi, which was carried out a week before the 2000, 9th 
of April, presidential elections in Georgia,. The questionnaire contained several blocks. In 
addition to standard instruments described below, it tapped Georgia’s priority problems as 
perceived by the population; Attitude toward different external orientations of Georgia; 
Attitude toward the presidential elections; characteristics of the elected president E. 
Shevardnadze as seen through public eye. 
 




579 respondents (297 males and 282 females) took part in the survey. Respondents were 
attributed to one of the three age groups: 18-25 years olds –210 respondents (105 males and 
105 females); 26-45 years olds- 190 respondents (97 males and 93 females); and 46-75 years 
olds – 179 respondents (95 males and 84 females). 
 
Majority of respondents had University education (86.6%), 13.4% had high or special 
education. 54% were married and 46% unmarried. 36.9% were state employees, students 
constituted 27.5%, 12.8% were unemployed, 11.5% worked in private enterprise, 5.3% were 
homemakers, 2% were pensioners, 4% worked in other types of organisations. The 
overwhelming majority of respondents did not belong to any political party, while only 
16.9% declared to be supporters of any such party. 
 
The survey assessed degree of optimism of respondents by Life Orientation Scale (Shreier & 
Carver, 1987), which is a 10 item instrument with “Yes” and “No” answer options, with 
items like: ”I always look on a bright side” and “I hardly expect things to go my way”. In all 
respondents demonstrated rather high optimism (M = .83, SD = .14 with a maximum possible 
positive score of 1). No age or gender related difference was found in optimism among the 
respondents.  
 
The survey has also assessed the locus of control of respondents. They were asked to choose 
one from the list of five statements, which most closely reflected their attitude. The 
statements ranged from “What can person achieve in life almost entirely depends on her/him”  
to “ [It] almost entirely depends on others and situation”. Respondents displayed rather high 
internal locus control (M = 2.09, SD = .77, score 2 corresponding to the statement “Mostly 
depending on oneself”). Significant age related difference was found (F = 3.54, p < .05), 
young respondents subscribing to much greater internal locus of control than older ones. 
 
About one third of respondents considered themselves to belong to poor families. Answering 
the question concerning the economic status of their families majority (59.8%) described it as 
of medium wealth, 25.8% called it poor and more 4.9% extremely poor, while 7.5% 
considered their families as well-to-do and 1.6% rich. Economical status was related to the 
locus of control (Pearson’s r = .12 p < .01). The well-to-do tended to be more internals and 
the poor - externals. But respective causal association is not deducible, as both the perception 
of economic status and internality rate correlate with age. Although the most widely accepted 
definition is medium wealth, the proportion of persons describing their families this way 
decreases with the age (67%, 60.2% and 52.5% in 1st, 2nd and 3rd age groups 
correspondingly), as was the case according to our 1999 survey, with a tendency of shifting 
towards poor and extremely poor. One possible explanation is different cohorts using 
different frames of reference, the young comparing themselves to other families and older 
respondents to their past economic situation.  
 
2. Country’s problems and external orientations 
 
Respondents were asked to choose three most urgent problems from the listed nine. Three 
problems that majority chose as needing the urgent resolution were economic development 
(78.5%), restoration of territorial integrity (57.5%), and combating corruption (52.6%). 
 
Figure 25 
Rank order of problems 
Age groups did not differ in the perception of importance of the problems. 
 
Choosing the answer to the question: by whom the future of Georgia was determined, 38.6% 
stated that it mostly depended on other countries, 32.4% on Georgia itself, 29.9% pointed that 
it equally depended on Georgia and other countries. On the background of the low level of 
perceived country’s self-reliance, it becomes important as to what country Georgians 
consider their international politics should be oriented. It should also be noted that 
preferential orientation of Georgia either toward Russia or the West is one of the central 
issues on political parties’ agendas. It remained an issue also with regard to international 
agendas of the presidential candidates. President Shevardnadze was stressing his orientation 
towards the West during his pre-election campaign, while the alternative candidate J. 
Patiashvili was assumed to be oriented rather towards Russia. Shevardnadze underlined the 
importance of oil and gas pipelines (from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and the Black 
Sea ports, as an alternative to the Russian route to the port of Novorossiisk) in his electorate 
campaign, making it the most salient feature where his achievements were the biggest. This 
was an important point, as the majority of the population considers this issue to be important 
for the future development of the country. 
 
The majority of respondents (55.1%) considers that Georgia should predominantly look 
mainly to the West, 17.2% prefer orientation to Russia and 27.7% cannot choose. There is a 
significant difference (Chi-square = 16.6; p < .005) between the age groups in the preferring 
of orientation. Younger generation chooses the West, the older Russia. From those who 
prefer Russia only 23.2% are 18-25 years olds, 35.4% are 26-45 years olds, 41.4% are 46-71  
years olds. At the same time, respondents revealed high level of scepticism with regards to 
the country’s current development direction: only 18.2% of the surveyed consider Georgia to 





Orientation of Georgia among respondents of three age-groups 
 
Foreign policy orientation is indeed an important variable, strongly favoured or disfavoured 
by the population and the élites. For the general population, foreign orientation may have 
important every-day connotation. So, among many changes that were brought by the new 
independence is the radical reorientation from Russian language to English. Most of new 
shops, offices or state institutions will have now Georgian and English labels, the latter 
replacing Russian ones characteristic for the Soviet period. It is also rare to hear Russian 
tongue in the street, although significant portion of the population still watches Russian TV 
broadcast and understands this language fairly well. There is also less of Armenian, 
commonly spoken previously in some districts of Tbilisi (Havlabar). Interesting trend was 
revealed by the 1996 Eurobarometer with regards to the role of mass media. On the question 
of the principal source of information on EU in Georgia, in comparison with other CIS 
countries, national television was named more frequently than Russian TV (72% and 48% 
respectively), while the latter was a more popular source for other CIS countries except 
Ukraine. The role of national television in Georgia rose significantly and the same happened 
to Russian television here since last year (compare to 39% national TV and 16% Russian TV 
in 1995). It seems that tolerance towards Russia in respect of informational source and future 
partnership had grown at that time among Georgian citizens as the political pressure of 
Russia has softened and Russia had weaker enemy image then it had in 1995 when Russia 
was considered to be involved in major political plots against Georgia’s interests. According 
to the Eurobarometer, in 1996, as compared to 1995, Russia was more often seen as a partner 
for the future in Georgia (51%) with a rise on 17 points from 1995. EU was seen as a future 
partner by 11% of the people, USA by 13%, Germany by 8% and other countries by 21%. 
However, now the trend seems to change direction, with opening of Russian border with 
Abkhazia, the war in Chechnya, anti-Georgian campaign in Russian media and the last year 
unprecedented bombing of the Georgian villages of Omalo and Shatili by Russian planes, and 
most recently the unilateral introduction of the visa regime in December 2000.  
 
Attitude of Georgians toward Russia has always been characterised by deeply rooted 
ambivalence. Russia was and still is seen as both the patron and the protector, on one hand, 
and as repressive imperial power, on the other. Policies toward Russia are at the heart of 
polemics among both the Georgian élites and the population at large, vacillating between 
naïve profiteering pragmatism and attitude marked with fear and aggressive hostility. While 
Georgians are deeply resentful of Russian imperial behaviour in the Caucasus and of Russian 
military presence in Georgia, a poll in 1997 suggested 24% of Georgians (it was 25% for 
Germany and 23% for US) considered Russia important to Georgia’s future. (USIA Opinion 
Analysis 1997) In 1998, 43% of those polled believed Georgia should ally itself either with 
Russia and the CIS, or with Russia and Western countries jointly, despite as little as 29% 
having a favourable view of Russia. (USIA Opinion Analysis 1998) At the same time, 
Georgian views of Russia are not only characterised by fear and suspicion, but also by long-
standing cultural connections and by recognition of Russia’s future importance after recovery 





In September 1998, when asked where Georgia’s place should be in the world, 68% answered 
with Europe, only 19% with the CIS and 3% with the Near East. (USIA Opinion Analysis 
1998) Germany and the United States were looked upon “favourably” by Georgians (87% 
and 85% of those polled respectively) compared to 32% and 29% for Turkey and Russia. 
(USIA Opinion Analysis 1998) In a 1998 USIA poll, 49% of Georgian respondents felt the 
main purpose of Western assistance to Georgia was to make it dependent on the West. In 
1996, only 31% had believed this. (USIA Opinion Analysis 1998) 
 
Since the elections of 1995, Georgia has steadily followed the free market precepts of the 
Bretton-Woods institutions, and its legislation incorporates Western values and achievements 
such as European and human rights conventions, the division of powers, and free market 
legislative norms and mechanisms. Still, Georgian foreign policy and its gradual re-
orientation toward Europe cannot be explained without an understanding of the Georgian 
elite’s perceptions of their cultural identity and its place in the world. It is these values or 
paradigms that might make up the framework of a Georgian ‘national project’, although 
Georgia’s foreign policy is still in the process of being formulated (Jones, 1999). These 
paradigms are relevant to the role of national identity in foreign policy and will be the 
reference points for any foreign policy ideology that may emerge in the future.  
 
Georgians are in general satisfied with their country’s membership in international and 
European organisations such as the Council of Europe (Georgia was approved in February 
1999), increased collaboration with the European Union and integration with the European 
market. There is widespread believe that Georgia’s future lies in the development of the 
Eurasian transport corridor (TRACECA – Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), transit 
of oil and exploiting its central position in serving as a strategic bridge between the West and 
the East, although the East is playing in such consideration somewhat secondary role. 
Georgia’s connection with Europe, will draw Georgia firmly into the Western sphere, provide 
both security and prosperity, safeguard against waning Russian influence. Polls in 1996-1998 
showed such policies were congruent with public opinion. At the same time, while countries 
of Central Europe have already gone far on their way of integration into European structures, 
Georgia, apart from recently achieved membership in the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, 
is weakly integrated into Europe. Regional organisations, of which Georgia is a member, 
either develops in the direction of further weakening ties – CIS, or had no vital energy from 
the very beginning, due to essential conflict of interest between its leading members - BSEC. 
Still, the Georgian government expresses openly, and this is approved by the majority of the 
population, its intention to integrate further in European and North-Atlantic structures. 
 
There are also cultural and historical biases, defining popular attitudes and preferences. 
Despite Georgia’s alliance with Azerbaijan and Turkey, in particular regarding the oil and gas 
pipelines issue, popular anti-Muslim sentiments are still observable. In 1997, Georgians 
protested the proposed establishment of a Turkish university in Georgia and publicly resisted 
the resettlement of Muslim Meskhetians in Southern Georgia, the border region from which 
they were expelled in 1944. (USIA Opinion Analysis 1998) Opinion polls suggest that most 
Georgians still have an unfavourable opinion of Turkey (56% in 1998). Turkey was second to 
Russia as a potential threat to Georgia (but only 16% compared to 50% for Russia). At the 
same time it is not the issue of confession alone, as e.g. Azerbaijan was given the second  
highest rating after the US (61% compared to 62%) as a country capable of dealing 
responsibly with problems in the Caucasus, and while 66% looked favourably on Azerbaijan, 
only 42% did so for Armenia. (USIA Opinion Analysis 1998) The distrust toward Turkey 
does not extend to Azerbaijan, and popular protests against Turkish influence in Georgia have 
had little impact on Georgian foreign policy. Shevardnadze continues to forge an economic 
and strategic alliance with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. (Jones 99) At the same time, 
Azerbaijan was given the second highest rating after the US (61% compared to 62%) as a 
country capable of dealing responsibly with problems in the Caucasus, and while 66% looked 
favourably on Azerbaijan, only 42% did so for Christian Armenia. (USIA Opinion Analysis 
1998) 
 
It is worth considering briefly, following available sociological data, other related aspects of 
the value system not covered by our surveys. One of these is the confessional aspect of self-
perception, closely linked to one of the dominant variable in Georgian identity – that of 
Orthodox Christianity, or Sunni Islam, for a minority of Ajarans, in addition to Shiya Azeris 
and Gregorian Armenians in Southern Georgia. How deep is this allegiance and how 
important is it in shaping people’s political values? For most Georgians, including political 
élites who use religious symbols to gain legitimacy, the church is a national rather than 
religious emblem. It represents politics, not metaphysics. (Jones, 1999) A United States 
Information Agency poll taken in 1997 suggested that only 8% of the population went to 
church at least once a week (USIA Opinion Analysis 1997) and in general Georgians, despite 
their public testament of religious faith, remain ambivalent toward the church. The same 
USIA poll recorded that 73% of Georgians considered themselves religious, but many see the 
church as corrupt and the priesthood low in prestige and poorly educated. Alongside public 
loyalty to the Orthodox Church, Georgians cultivate a myth of religious tolerance, and 
proudly stress the absence of a tradition of religious persecution in Georgia. At the same time 
the church has lost its symbolic function of preserving the national identity and declined 
lately in status, respect and relevance. It is becoming more and more politically marginal and 
reactive to increased influence of rivalling confessions, campaigns against other religious 
groups or organisations such as the Jehovah Witnesses, or even more acceptable Catholics, as 
demonstrated during the recent visit to Georgia of the Pope John-Paul II in December 1999. 
 
 
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT IN 2000 
 
Although a number of candidates (finally 6 of them) for 2000 presidential elections were 
registered, acting president Shevardnadze unequivocally stood out among these, as practically 
having no alternative. Former Shevardnadze’s successor as the First Secretary of the 
Georgian Communist Party (1985-1989) and his long-term rival, Jumber Patiashvili was 
considered as the only candidate who could compete in some way with Shevardnadze, but 
even he appeared to be no real match to the latter.  
 
Among the main issues of focus during the 2000 survey were the motivations behind taking 
part in elections, or the choice made, as well as the personality characteristics of the elected 
president as perceived by the population.  
 
Age of the respondents had a significant effect on the readiness to participate (Chi-square = 
17.39; p < .05). The older respondents expressed more willingness to vote. Among those who 
had decided to vote only 29.9% were 18-25 years olds, 33% were 26-45 and 37.1% were 
older than 45. The majority of the respondents (52.2%) considered that the wellbeing of the  
population greatly depended as to who would be the president of Georgia. More than 36.8% 
thought it was important, 6% were not sure, for 5% it was not important. However, not all 
that considered the personality of the president to be important were going to take part in 
elections. In fact, nearly half of those who acknowledged the importance of the personality of 
a president were not going to vote. Only 45.3% of the surveyed expressed readiness of 
participation, 21.1% were undecided a week before elections, 25% were sure not to 
participate and 8.6% refused to answer the question. Among those who were going to vote 
92.8% considered president’s personality to be important, but the proportion of those thinking 
so among those who were not going to vote was also quite high (85.4%). This points to small 
choice available or to the inability to influence outcomes: respondents felt the decision was 
important but nevertheless did not consider it reasonable to go and vote. The reasons named 
by those who were going to vote were ranked the following way: 41.6% named the civic 
responsibility as the motive for participation, 35.3% was taking part for the reason that their 
vote should not be misused. 15.3% stated their support for the candidate. 7.8% had different 
motives: e.g. that among candidate’s supporters there was their friends or some honourable 
persons. Mostly shared motive for not participating in elections (34%) among non-voters was 
their belief that Shevardnadze would win anyway. 27.8% was discouraged by the feeling that 
elections would not be fare. 12.1% named distrust to the candidates, 11.1% did not feel that 
their participation was important, 3.9% thought it was not important as to which candidate 
would win. 11.1% named other motivation.  
 
Respondents were asked to evaluate their confidence in candidates’ success with solving 
pertinent to Georgia problems (ranked previously on Fig. 25) on a scale ranging from 
strongly convinced that he will solve this or that problem (1) to absolutely non-confident in 
this (5). Overall on nine problematic for Georgia spheres Shevardnadze’s ability was 
estimated lower (M = 3.03; SD = 1.11) than Patiashvili’s (M = 2.79; SD = 1.18). Analysis of 
variance showed age (F = 4.06; p < .05) and gender (F = 8.12; p < .05) differences in the 
evaluation of Patiashvili’s prospective performance. Men and respondents aged 26-45 were 
significantly more positive toward him than were women and older respondents. At the same 
time, in the case of Shevardnadze there was difference only among age groups (F = 5.18, p < 
0.5), younger respondents assessing him more positively. The table below illustrates popular 
attitude towards Shevardnadze’s capacity or will to solve the most pressing national 
problems.  
Table 8 
Evaluation of E. Shevardnadze’s ability to solve problems 
(1=strongly convinced that he will solve a problem; 5 = strongly convinced that he is unable 
to solve a problem) 
No Problem Shevardnadze 
M (SD) 
1 Effective foreign policy 2.06 (1.2) 
2 Decrease of criminality 2.96 (1.2)* # 
3 Improvement of relationships with regions of 
Georgia 
2.97 (1.2)* 
4 Support of democratic values 2.99 (1.2) 
5 Economic development 3.20 (1.2)* 
6 Electricity on 24 hour bases  3.20 (1.2) 
7 Social security of population 3.31 (1.2)* 
 Restoration of territorial integrity 3.54 (1.2)* 
9 Combat of corruption 3.68 (1.2)* 
* Significant difference among age groups. # Significant difference among gender groups. 
 
As is evident from Table 8, foreign policy stands out as the most effective field of 
Shevardnadze’s activities, followed by decrease of criminality and carrying out effective 
regional politics. Gender has a small influence in the evaluations of Shevardnadze’s future 
performance, making difference only in one case, i.e. in combat of criminality where men 
express more trust in Shevardnadze than women do. Age exerts more decisive effect. It is 
evident in six spheres out of nine, mostly contrasting youngest and oldest groups. 
Respondents under 26 evaluate him much more favourably. 
 
Paradoxically enough, respondents expressed more trust in Patiashvili than in Shevardnadze 
(M=3.35; SD=1.2 and M=3.57; SD=1.3, respectively on a 5-step scale ranging from 1 - 
complete trust to 5 - distrust). Patiashvili was also better evaluated in regard to the fervently 
debated issue of the 9th April, 1989, tragedy (when the Soviet army troops violently 
dissolved nationalist manifestation in Tbilisi, leaving 20 dead). Respondents are more 
inclined to believe that Shevardnadze (then Soviet Foreign Minister) was more able than 
Patiashvili (then First Secretary of the Georgia’s Communist Party) to avoid the tragedy. 
Notably, there is significant gender difference in the case of Shevardnadze, as females are 
more convinced that he could avoid the tragedy. Similarly, Patiashvili’s motivation of acting 
in case of him becoming the president was evaluated more favourably than Shevardnadze’s. 
In case of both candidates the motive chosen by the most was interests of Georgia, but while 
42.5% believed that Patiashvili would act according this motivation, only 25.5% thought so 
in regard to Shevardnadze. Party interests were named as the second leading motive for 
Shevardnadze’s actions (24.5%). 21% thought that Shevardnadze will act in the interests of 
another country or international organisation. There are significant differences among age 
groups in regard of evaluation of Shevardnadze’s motivation (Chi-square = 15.68; p < .05). 
The highest proportion of 18-25 years olds (27%) believe that Shevardnadze will serve 
mostly his party interests, in the range 25-46 the most widely spread is the belief that he 
would act in the interests of Georgia (31.5%), while the relative majority of the oldest 
respondents think that Shevardnadze would serve other country’s interests (26.4%). 
Figure 28 
Actors whose interest Shevardnadze serves 
 
Respondents were then asked to go through the list of personality characteristics to check if 
they applied to each candidate. The list comprised both positively and negatively worded 
characteristics needed for successful holding the office such as being principal, forceful, fair, 
future oriented, having good reasoning ability, etc. Taken together, Shevardnadze’s 
personality was evaluated slightly more positively (M = .78, SD = .15) than Patiashvili’s 
personality features (M = .76, SD = .16), although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Significant difference was found among the age groups in the evaluation of 
Shevardnadze  
 
(F = 4.85, p < .01), older respondents giving the most negative assessment of him.  
 
Figure 39 
Shevardnadze’s characteristic features 
 
Thus, the findings indicate, that the population makes their decision based on such specific 
facts as lack of alternatives, fatalism, personal affiliations, orientation in international 
politics, rather than the ability to solve the most pertinent problems, trust in the leader, his 
good intentions and sound judgement, belief in serving one’s own nation as a main 
motivation for action, or past record of serving his nation. At the same time people have lost 
illusions concerning the quick resolution of such painful problems as restoration of territorial 
integrity, elimination of corruption, economic revival and better life conditions. Stability and 
centralisation of power are believed to be the most realistically desirable national objectives, 






A large number of people in Georgia are in the midst of profound change in basic values. 
Long-held beliefs about the meaning of work in one’s life, relations between men and 
women, expectations for the future – indeed, about many aspects of daily living and 
important relationships among people – are undergoing a re-examination and re-appraisal. 
The majority is hovering between older faiths in expanding horizons, and a new sense of 
lowered expectations, apprehension about the future, mistrust of institutions, and a growing 
sense of limits. People are in search of new rules, because the old rules don’t work any more, 
they are in the midst of fundamental reordering of the way they see the world around them. 
 
We have mentioned above the analytic primacy of values in explanations of political change. 
At the simplest, most direct level, shifts in value orientations induce change in modes and 
levels of political involvement. By examining these changing values, we try to understand 
how individuals react to changes, how people’s values lead them to accept or reject proposed 
changes in their lives. Now we can return to questions put at the beginning of the study. How 
can the political culture of present day Georgia be characterised, what tendencies can be 
traced in regard to the development of democracy? What values guide the behaviour of 
electorate? What are orientations conveyed by the political elite?  
When a culture undergoes a paradigm shift, the new paradigm does not immediately replace 
the old one as the dominant paradigm. Indeed, the processes of changing value orientations 
are not characterised by a rather straightforward replacement of existing value orientations by 
the new orientations. Rather, elements in traditional value orientation are gradually losing 
their authority or relevance, while other elements retain their force. The reconfiguration of 
values in new constellations is an intrinsic part of more general process of social change. 
Political interest, grass-roots activity, electoral turnout, and party choice are all influenced by 
changes in value orientations. The process of value changes will affect beliefs in government 
in two closely related ways. On the one hand, as rising cognitive mobilisation – in line with 
ongoing modernisation – goes along with emergence of new value orientations, the general 
consequence will be increasing levels of political self-confidence. Citizens will develop 
greater political efficacy and civic competence. On the other hand, new value orientations 
imply more critical attitudes towards traditional values and political authorities, this having 
direct consequences for levels of political trust and civicness.  
 
One may expect the population to be increasingly intent on pursuing non-material and 
emancipatory goals, as this happens in societies with longer democratic tradition. In place of 
an emphasis on material well-being, respect for authority, one expects to find a flowering of 
orientations which might be classed as expressions of self-fulfilment, independence or 
emancipation, described by such terms as ‘individualisation’, ‘post-conventional norms’, ‘de-
traditionalisation’, or the spread of ‘postmaterialism’, and arrival of ‘postmodern society’. In 
general, secularised orientations, left materialism, postmaterialism, sexual permissiveness, 
ecologism, feminism, postmodernism, and libertarianism are more evident among young 
people and the highly educated, who are exposed most intensively to new social 
arrangements and show greatest willingness to accept new ideas. Postmodernist (based on the 
notions of self-expression, pluralism and humanism), and postmaterialist (based on ideas of 
self-realisation, authenticity, and freedom) value orientations are important antecedents of 
civic competence and efficacy, of more self-confidence among grass-root activists and 
political actors. Decline of religious orientations undermines deference and the habits of 
political obedience. Government tends to find support among electorates that are much more 
diverse in orientations, which make it more difficult to put together the kind of broad 
consensus necessary to mount major political initiatives, but makes democracy stable and 
viable. 
 
Our study was an attempt to reveal some trends in the change of values as linked to the 
transformation of the society. Designing such a study raises questions about sample size and 
technique, about measurement and reliability, and about data analysis that needs resolving, 
but we consider our results as rather preliminary findings that need further elaboration and 
cross-checking.  
 
Results of our study pointed to alarming inertia in the society at large: changes in the 
mentality of the population required by societal transformation are slow to come about, while 
democratisation is impeded also by outdated ideological stereotypes and the vague status of 
democratic values in current modes of thought. Even if democratic principles are supported in 
abstract form, often citizens are reluctant to apply these principles on practice. Also, as it was 
described for more general post-Soviet setting (Gibson and Duch, 1993), the mass public is 
committed much more strongly to “majoritarian” democratic principles, such as popular 
sovereignty and competitive elections, than to “minoritarian” principles, such as civil liberties 
and the right of dissent. Reshaping of political culture is a long and a slow process even in  
case of conducive to the change environment. Hence in the environment governed by the 
mutual distrust of political elite and citizens, where elite in practice does not want and 
citizens do not feel the need to change, the process of reorientation is at its best very slow. 
 
Despite the demands posed by the change of political and economic structure and 
environment, cultural and political legacies hinder both élite and ordinary citizens in 
reorienting toward values of personal or corporate responsibility, transparency and 
accountability. Deeply rooted clientelism and corruption do not stimulate people in power to 
encourage public participation, on the other hand disillusioned ordinary citizens show apathy 
and accept the authority of those in power. An important corollary of our main findings is 
that there is widespread perception of little control over decisions of government, little trust 
in others and low satisfaction with own life. The way out from this closed, self-reinforcing 
circle could be seen in the activation of politically conscious and active population and in the 
will of the ruling party to incorporate population in policy making. In the long run the 
political survival of today’s élites depends on this will as further economic hardship, high rate 
of inequality and consequent popular discontent may swing the pendulum of public support 
to reform in opposite direction. Poor economic performance and continuous insecurity and 
humiliation may easily undermine the still embryonic democratic political culture.  
 
Our results have demonstrated the decisive effect of current conditions and needs on value 
orientations. Comparison with the data from other countries allows us to predict the 
development in this regard. As conceptualised by A. Maslow, needs form a hierarchy with 
basic safety needs at the bottom and non-material needs, like self-actualisation, at the top. 
Likely the two value orientations which were studied, i.e. of materialist and post-materialist 
ones, are advocated in response to the situation. People do not largely adhere to post-
materialist, libertarian, democratic values until more basic, materialist values of safety, 
stability and livelihood are not satisfied. This means that the process of democratisation 
cannot easily develop from scratch in the environment of economic hardship and threat to 
safety. Indeed, today the demonstrated trend is that the population seems to be ready to 
sacrifice democratic achievements to security, stability and minimum life-standards. So, e.g., 
our respondents were most unanimous in choosing order in the country over personal 
freedom. This is an alarming trend, as “Unless the bulk of the society is committed to a high 
valuation of these ideals [liberty and equality] it can hardly be expected that institutions 
predicated upon them will work successfully or long endure” (Pennock, 1956). 
 
Another alarming tendency is the great gap between political élites, actively involved in 
governance or directing opposition politics, and the population at large, emotionally 
concerned but lacking skills and levers for more political participation. Unwillingness of 
élites to take responsibility and initiatives needed for successful democratic transformation, 
lack of independent and creative thinking; are further aggravated by mutual suspicion and 
mistrust of political élites and masses, the centre and the periphery. Élites have no confidence 
in masses, try to avoid where possible democratic structures and procedures of decision 
making under the pretext of democratic immaturity of population and its lack of political 
knowledge and skills, or putatively due to economic hardship or external security threats. 
Similar attitude can be observed in relation to regional authorities, and especially to ethnic or 
religious minorities. Only a robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political 
alternatives and to monitor government and state, can resist democratic reversal and is a 
remedy against such tendencies. New value orientations should lead to demand more 
institutional openness, for citizens to have more direct input to government decision-making, 
but no emerging value orientations are rejecting the power of the national state as such. There  
is urgent need for development of participatory approach at all levels of governance, and to 
empowering individuals and communities to self-organise on the issues of protecting their 
interests, to create effective trade unions, consumer societies or other non-governmental 
structures. A clear understanding on the part of Georgian citizens of their rights and 
responsibilities cannot fully develop until there are strong and adequate instruments for 
protecting the rights, laws and norms on which a free society is built. On the other hand, 
increasing the identification of citizens with the state, especially by the representatives of 
ethnic or confessional minorities, is the path to securing effective participation, trust and the 
rule of law. 
 
As mentioned above, voting is the major democratic scene both where public participation in 
political process takes place, and where political élites compete among one another for 
influence and domination. Results of our study pointed to the democratic immaturity of the 
electorate, to high reliance on the personal features of the leader and indifference to party 
ideologies and agenda. However, there are certain positive trends observed as well. Such was 
the reinforcement of the opposition to ruling coalition in recent vote that points to the 
strengthening of the democratic environment. Preferences revealed indicate to increased 
expectation of electorate for positive political goals instead of overall criticism, craving for 
stability and positive outcomes. Failure of populist political groupings that achieved success 
in the 1998 local elections also reflect growing experience and electoral maturity, the 
population became less susceptive to populist slogans and cheap promises. Our study also 
pointed to different standards used by different cohorts in their evaluations of political issues, 
with younger people showing stronger adherence to post-materialist values. All in all the 
outlook of the generation of eighties is much more optimistic than the older ones, 
representatives of the former not only see their and their families’ state of affairs more 
positively but also have better general expectations for the future. 
 
Summing up we may say that while there are many obstacles to rapid positive change of 
political culture in the direction of more democratic one, the process is nevertheless on move, 
with younger generation showing more active and pro-democracy stance. Orientations toward 
the western models and values, support of market oriented reform and of civic values is good 
reason for moderate optimism with regards to immediate future, and for much brighter hopes 
in the long run. 
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